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ARTICLES
LAW AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRIVATIZATION
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MAXWELL 0. CMHBUNDU*
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
On February 21, 1996, the usual cacophony on the trading floor of
the New York Stock Exchange was livened up further by that most stere-
otypical of spectacles: a troupe of brightly clad African dancers, provid-
ing ceremonial amusement as a lead-in to more consequential business.1
The occasion, however, was not the entertainment of visiting "dignita-
ries," nor even the opening or closing ceremony of a sporting event.
Rather, these performers most of whom probably spoke not much more
than rudimentary English, let alone the arcane language of international
finance, in response to the sovereign edict of their nation state, Ghana,
had presented themselves at the high temple of finance to help celebrate
the opening of trading in "global Depository Receipts" of the shares of
Ashanti Goldfields Limited, a gold-mining company whose primary ex-
tractive operations are conducted in Ghana, whose principal managerial
skills are furnished by Australian, South African and British nationals,
and the shares of whose stock are traded on the Accra and London stock
exchanges.
Ashanti Goldfields is reportedly the first sub-Saharan African "oper-
ating" company to have its shares traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change.2 Until very recently a money-losing state-owned enterprise,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. See e.g. Out of Africa, NEWSDAY, Feb. 22, 1996, at A43; Ghanaians on Big
Board, NEw YoRK TIMES, Feb. 22, 1996 at D22; Kenneth Gooding, Ashanti Becomes an
African in New York, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 22, 1996, at 24.
2. See Ashanti Goldfields Commences Trading on New York Stock Exchange, Busi-
HEsS WIRE, Feb. 21, 1996 (available in Lexis/Nexis News Library, Wires file); THE Ft-
NANcIAL TIEs, supra Note 1. ASA Ltd., a South African investment company, has ap-
parently been trading on the New York Stock Exchange since 1958. See NEWSDAY, supra
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Ashanti Goldfields has become the darling not only of Wall Street, but
for somewhat longer, also of the London Stock Exchange. On its face, it
appears to epitomize the successful restructuring of one of the basket
cases of economic mismanagement in the dark continent.3 Its journey
from neglected and weed-infested properties to a resurgent en-
trepreneurial undertaking, funded not by governmental subsidies but by
private capital, seems paradigmatic of the new economic order, 1990s
style, in which the in-flow of portfolio rather than foreign direct invest-
ments has become the yardstick of the favorability rating of dependent
national economies within the centers of international finance, and, there-
fore, the arbiter of national economic performance. For the sovereign re-
public of Ghana, the crown jewel of its economy can now rely on the li-
quidity of its name recognition in the international marketplace to finance
Note 1. American Depository Receipts representing interests in fifteen African companies
are apparently being traded through the NASDAQ system. See Today's Briefing, THE DE-
TROrr NEWS, February 22, 1996. The Company's characterization as "sub-Saharan Afri-
can" apparently comes from the fact that its primary assets (gold-mines) are located in
Ghana, and that it is incorporated in Ghana. The Ghanaian Government currently owns
about 20% of the Company; another 40% is owned by the Anglo-Australian and South
African multinational, Lonrho, and the bulk of the remainder is owned by investors on
the London Stock Exchange. See THE NEW YoRK TraEs, supra Note 1; Harry Mouzalas,
Ghana To Sell $ 100 Min Ashanti Goldfields Stake, THE REUTER EUROPEAN BusINEss RE-
PORT, Jan. 31, 1996 (available on Lexis/Nexis News Library, Papers File.)
3. Aside from the initial success of the public offering - the offering price stood up
to trading on the opening day - an indicator of the dramatic restructuring of the Com-
pany, and indeed of Ghana, may be gleaned from the quadrupling of the production of
gold from about 280,000 ounces in 1985 to about a million ounces in 1995. See BusNEss
WRnE, supra Note 1. Like Ashanti Goldfields, Ghana has been touted as a success story
of the World Bank's "Structural Adjustment Program" in sub-Saharan Africa. See eg.
Lionell Demery & Lyn Squire, Macroeconomic Adjustment and Poverty in Africa: An
emerging Picture, WoRLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER, 1996 ("Cote d'Ivoire's failure to
adjust effectively to external shocks during the period of study provides a convenient
counterfactual to the success of the Ghana's reform efforts"); Ghana: A Model of Democ-
racy? FOREIGN REPORT, Aug. 15, 1996 ("[B]ecause Ghana has in the past few years been
proclaimed as a model of successful economic reform in Africa... it will be watched to
see if it can also be held up as a model of democratization."); Phillip Eade, Urgent Need
for Foreign Investment, EUROMONEY, June 1995, at 131 ("It has become almost a cliche
to say that Ghana is World Bank's African Showcase. In the 12 years since the govern-
ment began its structural adjustment programme (SAP), its combination of liberalizing re-
forms and strict fiscal and monetary measures has helped produce an average real growth
rate of 5% and bring inflation down from 120% to 30%"). But cf. Biting the Hand that
Squeezed Them, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 1995 at 48 ("Even Ghana, the donor's favour-
ite pupil, has lost some shine. While its GDP has grown by 5% a year over the past ten
years, much of this has been due to a large inflow of foreign aid. Now Ghana's prudent
housekeeping is lapsing. Inflation, having dropped to 18% per year, has rebounded to
50%.")
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future needs. Governmental policy need no longer be held hostage to the
unilateral decision of a single unhappy investor to withdraw from the
economy. For the foreign large shareholder such as Lonrhoe, the availa-
bility of a liquid international market creates an exit which does not en-
tail the "for better or for worse till death do us part" credo that previ-
ously governed much foreign direct investment in developing societies by
multinational companies. And as for the proverbial Belgian dentist or
Kansan wheat farmer being asked to risk her retirement nest egg, it sim-
ply marks the opening up of another frontier for risk diversification. But
how smooth down the Volta will the sailing be? Does the offering of
Ashanti Goldfields stock amount to any more than the all-too-frequent
historical "first," good only for the parlor game of "Trivial Pursuit," or
does it represent, finally, the coming of age of Africa-centered private
accumulation of capital and its nonconcessional integration into global
capitalism?
This article presents the reflections of an academic lawyer on a dec-
ade of the privatization phenomenon across the globe,4 and explores its
implications for the quest for economic growth and stable liberal political
order in sub-Saharan Africa. My primary interest is in illuminating the
relationship between legal craftsmanship, on the one hand, and the im-
peratives of socio-political and economic forces on the other. Its writing
is grounded on the view that the "privatization" movement is one area
in which lawyers and "law" have played demonstrably significant roles
in shaping and nurturing clear transformations in international political
economy.5
Privatization has attained the status of a self-validating orthodox
creed, and while there remain some doubters,6 privatization looks less
4. According to one recent report, the last decade has witnessed the privatization of
over 10,000 enterprises in more than one hundred countries. See Interpress Service,
March 1, 1996 (available in Westlaw's Magsplus Library.)
5. The issue of "constitutional" change is another. Unlike the privatization phenom-
enon, however, legal scholars have extensively debated the practical and normative impli-
cations of the role of law in bringing about these changes. See e.g. Robert C. Juelke,
Note, The Economic Causes and Consequences of Economic Reform in Eastern Europe,
34 Wm AND MARY L REv. 1367 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern
Front, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 555 (1993); Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Comments:
Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: e Duobus Unum? 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 511
(1991); Carlos Santiago Nino, The Debate Over Constitutional Reform in Latin America,
16 FORDHAm INT'L L. J. 635 (1993).
6. Recent political trends in Eastern Europe, notably the successes of heirs to the
communist parties of Poland and Hungary, and possibly Russia, political instability in It-
aly, and the less surefootedness of conservative parties in France, Britain and Germany,
when taken with outright protests against privatization in countries like Mexico and South
Africa, give pause for any unequivocal assertions about the future of privatization. These,
1997]
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and less like a "fad." '7 Among other structural reasons, privatization quite
comfortably fits the current three-part chime of "free market," "democ-
racy" and "rule of law." Further, its practice has been sufficiently re-
warding to definite and identifiable groups in pockets of professional and
entrepreneurial activities all over the world, so that it has established
constituencies that can only be dislodged by a powerful counterwave that
is currently nowhere in sight. Above all, the process has become suffi-
ciently routine and seemingly sufficiently understood so that it is no
longer arcane, and as such it can be marketed at minimal intellectual cost
across the globe. In other words, we have stopped asking foundational
questions about privatization, and to the extent we ask any questions at
all,. they focus on how particular transactions can be more efficiently
accomplished.
In keeping with this transcendent global trend, privatization is being
vigorously advocated as a cure for much that ails sub-Saharan Africa.
While economists and political scientists have vigorously debated the
normative implications for their disciplines and for society of their varied
however, appear as no more than quite weak cautionary diversions on the road to priva-
tization. See generally EUROMONEY, February 1996 (a special issue on privatization that
summarizes the history of and background to privatization as a global commercial phe-
nomenon, and provides prognostications on its future); Compare Selling the State, THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995 (observing that when history of the 1980s and 1990s is written,
privatization would be a hard chapter to write, and that it has been getting "bad press"
despite its "historic sweep."); and Unexpected Record Proceeds in 1995, PRIVATISATION
INmRNATIONAL, Jan. 1, 1996 (stating that the future for privatization is "rosy.")
7. Compare Mary N. Shirley, Colloquium: The What, Why, and How of Privatiza-
tion: A World Bank Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L REV. 23 (1992); DAVID J. DONALDSON &
DILEEP M. WAGLE, PRrVATIZATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTCE (1995); ANMED GALAL AND
MARY SHIaLEY, EDS. DOES PRIVATIZATION DELvERA? (1994). These works, while recogniz-
ing the political components of the decision to privatize, steadfastly attempt to demon-
strate empirically that privatization generates significant accretion to national wealth, and
by dissemination of such information, they seek to promote its propagation and to fore-
stall any relapse into state ownership and control of productive resources. In this, they
may have well succeeded. The volume of privatization in 1995 was reportedly worth 73
billion dollars, up from 64 billion dollars in 1994. This figure was particularly astonishing
since the first half of that year witnessed only 18 billion dollars in privatization attributed
largely to the peso crisis which resulted in significant outflow of portfolio investment
from Mexico. Moreover, investor interest in infrastructural enterprises such as telecommu-
nications, transportation networks, electricity and water, and the apparent willingness of
hitherto reluctant governments to surrender control over these resources seem to assure
the continuation of the phenomenon. See Unexpected Proceeds in 1995, supra note 6.
This is not to dismiss, however, continuing conflicts over how and what ought to be
privatized, especially by labor unions. These conflicts, however, whether in Russia,
France, Mexico, or South Africa, do not directly challenge the concept of privatization,
merely specific implementations.
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prescriptions for dealing with the transforming changes that fall within
their bailiwick (price stabilization and money supply, for example, for
economists; civil, liberal or democratic societies, for political scientists), 8
the discipline of law, in dealing with privatization, has engaged in very
little of such discussion. Because privatization is part of and may be inte-
gral to the current fundamental structural shift in international political
economy, that is, the organizing norms, rules, and procedures of contem-
porary international society, such a discussion is called for both as an in-
tellectual and a practical need. Its exploration in the sub-Saharan African
context is especially necessary because the peoples of that region of the
world exercise much less control over their own destiny than do most
others. Additionally, their futures depend at least as much on the procliv-
ities of external donors and lenders who are insulated from the conse-
quences of their decisions as on the decisions of domestic leaders and in-
stitutions ostensibly accountable to those whom they rule. Lacking the
exemplary effect of direct accountability, the decisions of these foreign
mandarins hopefully may be affected - at least at the margins - by in-
telligible, coherent rational explanations.
This essay is thus a preliminary attempt at getting some of these
necessary conversations going. It begins by acknowledging the varied
meanings of "privatization," and the importance of localizing privatiza-
tion decisions in the quite distinct cultural and political spheres that con-
tinue to exist notwithstanding the frequently heard-of "globalization" of
international economic practices. With that understanding established, the
essay explores the relevance of law and lawyering in the process, and
seeks to link these roles with the broader normative shifts in current lib-
eral legal thinking, especially in the arenas of constitution-making and in
the transitional societies and the development of a post-Cold War eco-
nomic order. The essay concludes by concertizing the interplay of legal
technocracy with instrumental economic and political forces by examin-
ing the privatization phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa generally and in
Nigeria in particular.
II. THE AMBIGUrnm OF PRrVATIZATnON
Like so many concepts that elicit unquestioning adherence by the
millions and equally uncritical rejection by a like number of others,
"privatization" lacks an easily rendered definition. Its diversity embraces
8. See e.g. JEFFREY SACHS, SHOCK THERAPY: POLAND'S JUMP TO THE MARKEr ECON-
OMY (1993); MARSHALL GOLDMAN, WHY ECONOMIC REFORMS IN RUSSIA HAVE NOT
WORKED (1994); BEVERLEY CRAWFORD, ED., LOST OPPORTUNITY: MARKErS, STATES AND
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POST-COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATION (1995).
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such practices as the contracting out by a government of the provision of
such quintessentially "public" services as military defense9 and the run-
ning of prisons,'0 to the withdrawal of government ownership of or par-
ticipation in entities engaged directly in industrial or agricultural produc-
tion. Perched somewhere in between these two is the opening up to
private participation of enterprises whose public ownership or control
have hitherto been the source of internecine debate: post and telecommu-
nications, airports and airlines, and public utilities including electricity,
water and wireless broadcasting. What molds this broad idea of "priva-
tization" into anything approaching coherence appears to be that it re-
lates to mechanisms and arrangements (however loosely structured) that
share the goal of reducing or eliminating state and/or governmental own-
ership or control over entities whose primary raison d'etre lies in the
socio-economic realm."
9. While the "mercenary" soldier long has exemplified the contracting out of the
rending of military service, the engagement was generally surreptitiously undertaken, the
"soldiers of fortune" tended to be employed by anti-government groups, and where they
were employed by the recognized government of the state, they were generally integrated
within the overall supervision and command of a national military hierarchy. More re-
cently, however, the use of such services as South Africa's "Executive Outcomes," the
Dutch registered "International Defense and Security," and the U.S.-based "Military Pro-
fessional Resources" by such African governments as those of Sierra Leone and Angola,
and by the Baltic states of Eastern Europe, suggests a high degree of the ceding of legiti-
mate control over military power (when, where and how to use it) to private entities. See
eg. Angolan Diamonds: On the Rocks, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 1996 at 68; Paul Harris,
Privatizing War: Military Advising is Growth Industry, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, Aug. 26,
1996; Danielle Gordon, No Peace for South Africa's Wand'ring Warriors; Executive Out-
comes Uses Angola As Training Ground For Mercenary Soldiers, BULLETIN OF THE
ATOMIC ScIEms1S, May 1996 at. 5; Phillip Winslow, The Business of War, MACLEAN'S,
Nov. 6, 1995 at 33; We're the Good Guys These Days, THE ECONOMIST, (U.S. Ed.) July
29, 1995 at 32. See also Barbara Starr, US Firm to Train Muslim Federation in Bosnia,
JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, June 5, 1996 (reporting on the contracting out to Military Pro-
fessional Resources of the undertaking of the U.S. Government to train the "Federation
Army" of Bosnia-Herzegovina); Mark Thompson, Generals For Hire, TIME, Jan. 15,
1996 (private military training firm may train Muslims.)
10. Thus, in the United States, the provision of sleeping accommodations for prison-
ers and their supervision is extensively contracted out to private parties. For the legal im-
plication of the privatization of the prison system in the U.S., see generally Ira P. Rob-
bins, Symposium: Privatization of Prisons; Privatization of Corrections: Defining the
Issues, 40 VAND. L REv. 813 (1987). See also John G. Dipiano, Note, Private Prisons:
Can They Work? Panopticon in the Twenty-First Century, 21 J. CRmt & CrV. CON. 171
(1995); Kenneth L. Avio, Private Prisons: An Economic Analysis of the Model Contract
and Model Statute for Private Incarceration, 38 AIt U. L. REv. 531 (1989); Brian B. Ev-
ans, Comment, Private Prisons, 36 EMORY L. J. 253 (1987).
11. Compare Testimony of James A. Waddell Before the Small Business Committee
of the U.S House of Congress, April 14, 1994 ("Privatization is the process of transfer-
[Vol. 21
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Although routinely justified on the classic economic grounds of pro-
ductive and allocative efficiencies, it is simultaneously advanced as a
necessary component of political liberalization. In the most commonly
idealized image of privatization, a state divests itself completely of all in-
terests in a commercial venture, and relegates its involvement in the af-
fairs of that entity solely to that of an impartial regulator, leaving it to
the ingenuities of profit-maximizing entrepreneurs to create national
wealth. By and large, this form of "privatization" accurately defines the
process in a very limited number of societies and cases, notably the
United Kingdom since 1984.12 But even in some of these cases, the prac-
tice is muddied up by the government retaining a "golden share" which
empowers the government to intervene at its discretion - usually said to
be in extraordinary circumstances - and to exercise a veto over other-
wise legitimate managerial decisions of the entity.1 3 In the vast majority
of cases, such complete disinvestment of state ownership and near-
complete relinquishment of governmental control constitute the exception
rather than the rule.
These definitional ambiguities are borne out in the mechanisms em-
ployed to realize the object. They range from "partial privatization," in
which the state retains some ownership, exercising only such control as it
would be entitled to were it a private shareholder, to "commercializa-
tion," in which government ownership and control (nominal and real) re-
ring productive operations and assets from the public sector to the private sector. Broadly
defined in this fashion, privatization is much more than selling an enterprise to the high-
est bidder, as it included contracting out, leasing, private sector financing of infrastructure
projects, liquidation, mass privatization, etc. My testimony will argue that there is no sin-
gle "best approach" to privatization; the appropriate privatization path depends on the
goals that the government is seeking to attain, the individual circumstances facing the en-
terprise, and political context of the country.")
Although this description of "privatization" suggests its affinity with "economic lib-
eralization," it is worth noting that the two concepts are not necessarily always in coinci-
dence. As explained in the African context, economic liberalization - at least as pushed
by such international financial institutions as the World Bank and the International Mone-
tary Fund - may entail greater rather than less state involvement. Nonetheless, privatiza-
tion is properly viewed as a subset of the now-dominant neoliberal order.
12. See e.g. Steven L Wolfram & Bruce C. Bennett, Multinational Offerings: A
United States Perspective After British Telcom, British Gas, and British Airways, 1987
COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 339. Similarly, while "privatization" has not been a dominant fea-
ture of political economy in the United States, the few examples of privatization of gov-
ernment-controlled .commercial entities such as Conrail and some data-gathering agencies
in the U.S. Department of Commerce have been of this variety.
13. On the use of the "golden share" in French and British privatizations, see e.g.
Alexander Marquardt & Ellen H. Clark, French Privatizations and International Capital
Markets, 15 N.W.U. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 408, 417-18 (1994).
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main complete, but operators are given a free hand de jure (and may be
allowed de facto) to operate the enterprise as an economic profit-seeking
entity that responds directly to market forces,' 4 to "denationalization," in
which state ownership is "formally" abolished (or more likely reduced),
but de facto control remains effectively in the hands of state-directed bu-
reaucrats or employees. I"
The structure adopted by a particular society doubtless reflects its
peculiar political economy. In all cases, however, the lawyer as an artisan
of the art of negotiation, draftsmanship or advocacy plays a central role;
for whatever the socio-political or economic structure of the society, a
continuing vital reality is that concepts of ownership and control are
neither self-defining nor self-enforcing, but are directly molded and fash-
ioned by the contingent interactions of influential persons and institutions
within the society. Whether in the West or in the East, whether in capi-
talist or communist societies, neither ownership nor control is ever fully
vested or fully denied to an entity. Ownership entails some but by no
means absolute control, and attributes of ownership unavoidably inhere in
the concept of control.' 6 Indeed, much of the work of economic law is
dedicated to seeking to arbitrate the shifting margins of the rights attribu-
table to these concepts, and as I shall discuss below, privatization, how-
ever embraced, does not remove this regulatory function of the state.
The idea of privatization is not a new one. Although most pro-
foundly actualized only in the last decade, its roots lie quite sometime
further back. But contrary to the dominant literature of the 1960s and
1970s, which drew a distinction between "legal" monopolies in which
state intervention was thought advisable to effectuate social equity and
economic development, and "natural monopolies," in which state inter-
vention was essential to assure allocative equity and efficiency, the priva-
tization movement of the 1980s and 1990s has not endowed special sig-
nificance to these distinctions. Privatization has occurred as readily in
natural monopolies (necessarily interdependent networks of "essential fa-
cilities" such as transmission lines for "public utilities"), as in legal mo-
nopolies, such as the generation of electrical power, mail delivery, and
ownership of transportation depots; i.e. assets that although readily repli-
cable derive their superior economic value only as long as their eco-
nomic scarcity is promoted through the legal regime.' 7 Nor have the ex-
14. See infra notes 76-80, 112-115 and accompanying text.
15. Much of the privatization in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS states
would appear to fall into this category.
16. See e.g. Note, Russian Property Law, Privatization, and the Right of "Full Eco-
nomic Control," 107 HARv. L. REv. 1044 (1994).
17. Compare MARGARET THATCHmR, DOWNIG STREET YEARS at 668-87.
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tractive industries - the mining of raw materials and the exploitation of
natural resources such as forestry products - necessarily been deemed
"national patrimonies" beyond the power of a transient government to
dispose of.18 Rather, the central focus of current privatization movements
has been the structure of the process, and thus, despite the clear ideologi-
cal underpinnings of privatization, this focus has effectively channelled
attention to matters of practical legal and economic choices: assets sales
versus securities underwritings, public offerings versus private place-
ments, limited consortia biddings versus mass vouchers. In these, law has
played at least a nominal visible role, and the lawyer, undoubtedly a cen-
tral role.
1H. LAW AND LAWYERING IN THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS
Few processes better demonstrate the paradoxical and complemen-
tary relationships of political ideology and legal pragmatism than the
tackling at the global level of "privatization." 19 The ascendancy of mixed
economies in the industrialized capitalist nations of the world in the post-
World War II era assigning to the state not simply a regulatory function,
but planning, control and even ownership roles in "key sectors" or
"commanding heights" of the economy, 2° generated lively academic dis-
cussions among social scientists about the nature of the role of the state
in the economy. The obvious relevance of political ideology in the dis-
cussion was clear, for at one extreme lay the overthrown 19th century
"laissez-faire" industrial capitalism of the poor laws and the robber bar-
ons, and at the other the Leninist-Marxist gospel of state ownership and
control of all means of economic production.21 Both ideologies were
given formal expression in the network of rules and regulations that de-
fined ownership, use and transfer rights on the part of the individual or
the state. It is in the extent to which these so-called "property rights"
18. Thus, although many Latin American countries, notably Mexico, in response to
their historical experiences constitutionalized state ownership of some basic resources
such as mineral products, these limitations have proved at most to be weak restraints on
the privatization process. In Mexico, for example, this constraint has at best slowed down
the privatization of the petro-chemical industry.
19. For a frst-hand account at the highest level of the mix of politics and econom-
ics in the privatization decision-making process, see MARGARET THATCHER supra note 17,
at 668-69, 685-87.
20. See e.g. CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, PoLmcs AND MARKETS (1977); JoH KENNEH
GALBRAITH, INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY. Cf. A. Allan Schmid, State and Market: When Com-
mand Goes Capitalist, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PoLrICAL THEORY, David Reisman, Ed.
(1994) at 129 (discussing the interplay of command and exchange in the transitional
economies of post-cold war Eastern Europe.)
21. See CHARLES E. LINDBLoM, supra note 20.
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shape and are shaped by the various privatization schemes that constitute
the bulk of the intellectual discussion on "privatization."22 Meanwhile,
much of the practical lawyering skills are devoted to the instrumental
packaging and allocation of these "rights" through formal legal docu-
ments. The efficacy of the legal structures now being erected over the
long run is yet to be proved, but there seems little doubt that it will de-
pend in significant measure on how accurately these structures approxi-
mate and assimilate (or are assimilated into) the social structures, politi-
cal habits and economic propensities of the composite interests whose
interactions shape the relevant national communities. It is thus worth ob-
serving that while the intellectual discourse on privatization prior to the
1980s focused on defining the range and character of products and ser-
vices best left to the "market" and those more efficiently and effectively
organized under the aegis of governmental power,23 the emergence of
privatization as a global phenomenon in the 1980s was not a thought-
through response or product of these discussions. Rather, it was the expe-
dient and in many ways accidental product of thoroughgoing political
fisticuffs. Britain,- and more specifically her combative former Prime
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, blazed the path. As she readily admits in
her autobiography, whatever economic sense there was for privatization,
the political and ideological considerations were far more important.24 On
the latter point, it was not simply that the state had no business running
essentially commercial concerns like British Steel or British Airways, but
privatization was an instrument of the Conservative Party's war against
Left Trade Unionism.2
Although engaging in very little domestic privatization of it own, it
was ultimately the political power and economic resources of the United
States that assured for privatization a more than passing notoriety. U.S.
22. See e.g. Note, Russian Property Law, Privatization, and the Right of "Full Eco-
nomic Control", supra note 16; Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights, 12 ARiz. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 183 (1995). See generally DAVID J. DONALDSON & DnIEEP M. WAGLE,
supra note 7.
23. See generally Charles E. Lindblom, supra note 20.
24. MARGARET THATCHER, supra note 17 at 668-69.
25. Id. at 686. Notably, this posed an ironic difficulty for the privatization of the
coal-mines, the hot-bed of British left-wing unionism. An element of privatization in-
tended to diffuse as much as possible Union opposition was to require sizeable worker
purchase of shares in the privatized company. The most productive mines in Britain, and
those most likely not to be closed down just before or immediately after privatization,
also happened to be worked by the most radical members of the Coal Miners' Union. As
a consequence, the one industry that the Conservative Party would have most loved to
privatize presented the greatest opportunity for windfalls of ownership, control and em-
ployment to its most hated adversary.
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lawyers, accountants investment bankers, economists and hedge-fund
speculators fanned out to all comers of the globe to spread the gospel of
the triumph of entrepreneurial private capital over statist control or own-
ership of the means of production, accumulation or distribution. In all
four comers of the globe, they found willing converts, but rarely because
privatization made intellectual sense.
Privatization experiences in Eastern Europe26 as in many Latin
American countries27 were driven as much by internal political factors as
by the external economic benefits to be derived from the practice. In
both societies, the process was integral to the redefinition of the structure
of the society in which the authoritarian or corporatist role of the state
has been supposed to take a back-seat to the promotion of a liberal civil
order dominated by an ethos of local individual entrepreneurialism, fos-
tered by foreign capital, and cemented by free market exchange. In East-
em Europe, privatization was essential to the new post-communist politi-
cal order because it directly undermined the central tenet of communism
- at least as practiced in those societies - state ownership and control
of the means of production, accumulation and distribution. Those who
challenged thus found in privatization a graphic (and some have said
"revolutionary")? demonstration of their rejection of the past, and a con-
crete statement of the new future. Acceptance of privatization could thus
form a litmus test for distinguishing between the old and the new.
"Mass" or "voucher" privatizations symbolically express the antip-
athy of the new emerging order to the communist past which touted state
ownership of all means of production. Symbolically satisfying though
mass privatizations may be, they suffer from significant practical short-
comings. Mass privatizations do not (at least as an initial matter) raise
substantial pools of capital. Furthermore, they are highly unlikely to re-
sult in changes of managerial control, nor in the infusion of new exper-
tise. Thus, to the extent that the economic underperformance of enter-
prises under the old communist order was attributable to under-
capitalization, the misallocation of capital, and poor managerial supervi-
sion and control, mass privatizations are unlikely to provide solutions in
the short run. But they nonetheless serve the highly legitimating purpose
of presenting an aura of distributive fairness, and of giving a significant
26. See e.g. JOAN M. NELSON, INTRICATE Lum's; BEVERLY CRAWFORD, supra note 8;
KAzmInEREz POZNANSKY, ED., THE EVOLUTIONARY TRANSTON TO CAPrrALiSM (1995).
27. See e.g. Werner Baer & Melissa Birch, Privatization and the Changing Role of
the State in Latin America, 25 N.Y. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1992); Leslie Elliott Armijo,
Menem's Mania?: The liming of Privatization in Argentina, 1 S.W. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1
(1994).
28. See generally CRAWFORD, supra note 8,; POzNIANsKI, supra note 26.
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proportion of the public a vested interest in the success of the new order.
Moreover, to the extent that only a fraction of the enterprise economy
undergoes mass privatization, the significant remainder can be subjected
to other forms of privatization, thereby providing an avenue for recon-
ciling the rhetoric of "democratic capital" with the reality of exclusivity
essential to capital accumulation and self-sustaining formation. Here, law-
yers and investment bankers can and have been highly influential. They
have sought to reconcile the political imperatives of mass participation in
the restructured economy with the resource demands for capital, manage-
rial expertise, rationalized inputs, standardized and predictable outputs.
Because these latter often require not simply the wholesale dismantling
of existing enterprise structures but the infusion of new managerial per-
sonnel and lines of control, lawyers have been confronted with elemental
issues of devising and refining appropriate conceptual legal norms in the
areas of ownership, use and control of privatized assets,29 and distributing
rights between foreign and domestic holders of these rights. The un-
bundling of property and contractual rights, then, and their repackaging
into new institutional arrangements have been the mainstay of the priva-
tization process in Eastern Europe. The extent to which these can be
achieved through fiat - legislative edicts and presidential decrees and
proclamations - is a source of disagreement among observers.30 In large
measure, the debate raises the question of the extent to which "the law"
represents ideological commitments, and the extent to which it reflects
practical political and economic compromises.
The state in Latin America has never arrogated to itself sole owner-
ship or control of all means of production, accumulation or distribution.
Even in the most corporatist of Latin American states, private ownership,
management and control of economic assets were the norm. State owner-
ship and control of productive economic assets, the range of which has
vacillated over time,31 remained concentrated in such predictable spheres
29. See generally, Note, Russian Property Law, supra note 16.
30. Id. See also Douglas R. Haddock, Private Property and Russia's Leap of Faith,
24 ST. MARY's LJ. 495 (1993); Kim Reisman, Note, The World Bank and the IMF: At
the Forefront of World Transformation, 60 FoRDHAm L. REV. 349 (1992); Steven E. Hen-
drix, Myths of Property Rights, 12 AIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183 (1995). Cf. Enrico
Colombatto & Johnathan R. Macey, Path-Dependence, Public Choice, and Transition in
Russia: A Bargaining Approach, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'y 379 (1995) (applying pub-
lic choice methodology to explain the packaging and distribution of "new rights" in
property in the emerging/transition economy of post-Soviet Russia.)
31. Compare Amy Chua, The Privatization-Naturalization Cycle: The Link Between
Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995) (discuss-
ing the cyclical history of phases of "privatization" and "nationalization" in Latin
America and South East Asia.)
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as raw material extraction, capital intensive heavy industries, finance, and
armaments production. The sizeable remainder of the economy engaged
in import substitution industrialization, agriculture, and the provision of
basic services such as health, housing, primary and secondary education
has always been in private hands; sometimes effectively regulated, at
other times not.32 Thus, state ownership in much of pre-Brady Plan Latin
America could be viewed as a heightened form of state regulation appro-
priate where traditional administrative regulation was deemed insufficient
to protect large scale national economic interest.
It might be thought, therefore, that contemporary privatization in
Latin America reflects a belief more in its economic benefits than in its
utility as an ideological or political tool. Indeed, much of the justificatory
rhetoric of privatization in these countries - especially in the larger
economies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico - has been framed in
economic terms: the debureaucratization of decision-making, the alloca-
tive efficiency of resource management and utilization, incentives for the
repatriation by nationals of capital secreted in foreign financial institu-
tions, the encouragement of foreign investment, and the like.33 Although
these justifications are not without foundation, and are indeed buttressed
by the weak hand these countries had in playing the external debt game
of the 1980s,34 it would be shortsighted to overlook the significance of
political forces in shaping the form of privatization in these countries. In
Mexico, for example, privatization took an essentially outward looking
approach in part because an inward looking one would have directly con-
tested the political legitimacy of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary
Party.35 In Argentina, privatization became a means by which the Peronist
32. Compare HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN
THE THIRD WORLD (1989) (discussing the pervasiveness of the "informals" consisting of
private actors in such diverse areas as small scale manufacturing or "industry," trade or
commerce, transportation and housing).
33. See e.g. Rafael Porrata-Doria, Jr., Privatization of Public Enterprises in Latin
America, 87 Am. Soc. INr'L PROC. 124 (1992); David D. Hale, Stock Markets in the New
World Order: Emerging Capital Markets, 29 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 14 (1994); Survey,
Debtor's Prison - Third World Finance, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1993 at 15. On the
significance of "flight capital" to the privatization process, compare Thomas M. Reiter,
The Feasibility of Debt-Equity Swaps in Russia, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 909 (1994).
34. Specifically, policy-makers in the United States and the International Monetary
Fund insisted on structural reforms within these Latin American economies as prerequi-
sites for substantial debt refinancings such as those extended under the "Brady Plan."
35. See e.g. JORGE G. CASTANEDA, THE MExcA SHOCK: ITS MEANING FOR THE
UNITED STATES (1995); Anne Swardson & Martha M. Hamilton, Investment Funds Link
Economy Series, WAsH. POsT, Aug. 21, 1995 at 2. That legitimacy has been further un-
dermined by recent highly publicized disclosures on dealings between members of the
Salinas family and the ruling party, on the one hand, and Mexican businessmen who
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President has not only maintained but enhanced his grasp on power.36
Not surprisingly, then, whether in Russia or Poland, Mexico or Argen-
tina, the privatization process has been tainted by stories of massive cor-
ruption: the use of entrusted political power to siphon off public assets
for private gains on grossly unequal exchange terms.37
In all of these cases, law and lawyers have been instrumental in
fashioning, advising on, and implementing privatization. Along with in-
vestment bankers, they have also been the loudest cheerleaders of the
privatization parade.
As a practical matter, legal interventions in contemporary privatiza-
tions occur at three levels: legislation drafting, administrative implemen-
tation and client counselling and representation. Mired in the technical
details evoked by these classic lawyering roles, much of the legal litera-
ture on privatizations has concentrated on the assertedly complicated
practical puzzles that must be resolved, and the sometimes brilliant
troubleshooting solutions that the best trained Western legal minds have
divined for them. Without detracting from the value of these functional
solutions, a proper appreciation of the role of law in the process requires
exploration of the nature of the legal service appropriate to the stage, not
simply what is provided. Further, that demand must be viewed in the
context of the legal structure of the privatizing economy.
Thus, with regard to the enactment of the governing legislation, 3 the
utility of the lawyering function depends less on the clarity and specific-
ity of language than on the effective integration of the process with the
administrative structure of the society. The latter is itself a direct product
of the long-term experiences of the society. A lawyer cannot rely simply
on her draftsmanship or even her prior experiences with other privatiza-
tion schemes, but must take into account the constitutive political and ad-
ministrative structures of the privatizing state. The British experience,
benefitted from privatization programs on the other.
36. See Leslie Elliott Armijo, supra note 27.
37. For example, in Mexico, the Salinas family alone reportedly obtained in excess
of $100 million as part of the privatization process, and the pervasiveness of corruption
in Russian privatization has become virtually a daily item in news reports of that country.
See e.g. Joel Millman, Mexico Probe Calls a Sell-Off Suspicious, Questions Role of Ex-
President's Brother, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1996 at A15; cf. Laurie Hays, Friend in the
Citi: Private Banker Wooed, Then Sought to Drop Mexico's Raul Salinas, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1, 1996 at Al (describing relationship between Citibank and brother of former Mex-
ico President in moving money out of Mexico into anonymous/pseudonymous Swiss
banking accounts).
38. See e.g. MARGARET THATCHER, supra note 17 at 684-85. See also Douglas
Webb, Privatization in Latin America and the Caribbean: Legal Issues, 87 Am. Soc.
INT'L PROC. 105, 111-19 (1992).
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contrasted with the East European and Latin American approaches, illus-
trates the point.
Given British constitutional structures, each privatization necessi-
tated a specific Act of Parliament which authorized the disposition of
specific governmental property, and the mode of that disposition. The
text of the legislation was particular to the interest being divested, and
the manner of the divestiture. Although these decisions became law by
virtue of their adoption by Parliament, they invariably represented the
policy objectives of the ruling Conservative Party. Relevant negotiations
and compromises were struck prior to the enactment of the legislation,
and these were made within a constitutional framework of rigid party
discipline, a publicly self-effacing but subterraneously powerful and
highly disciplined permanent bureaucracy or civil service, and a political
framework whose legitimacy is for all intents and purposes no longer
contested. The orderliness of the political process was thus assured, and
the compromises that needed to be struck tended to be with managers of
the entities to be privatized, rather than with competing social and politi-
cal forces within society.39 These compromises generally revolved around
specific issues of implementation rather than broad ideological issues.
Once struck, however, the agreements were implemented through more
or less transparent processes whose viability was assured by the stability
of the participating institutions.
A society like Britain with such an insulated tradition of more or
less transparent appreciation of the rules of the game can rely on positive
legislative enactments to provide a surefooted roadmap for the privatiza-
tion of the enterprise that it covers. Participants can reliably assume that
the legislation will not turn out to be a mirage because the administrative
structure responsible for the implementation of the legislation is no less
well institutionalized than the enacting body, and the implementing rules
can be expected to fall within a reasonably defined field. In such an en-
vironment, an open commitment to mass participation can be made with
the certainty that past experience is a good predictor of future outcome.
Other privatization schemes have sought to mimic the form of the
British practice. However, lacking many of the institutional features that
characterized the British polity, it is hardly surprising that the results
have been substantially different. For example, although lawyers are fre-
quently called upon to draft a presumptive constitutive document to gov-
ern the privatization process, the scope of these documents has been but
anything like the particular privatization documents employed by the
U.K. government. Thus, the constitutive documents in countries like
39. MARGARET TIATcmR, supra note 17, at 686.
19971
16 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
Mexico and Russia often have covered several disparate cases of priva-
tization, and left many of the crucial decisions to the post hoc discretion
of the executive branch and its administering agencies.40 Given the ab-
sence in these societies of a tradition of strict adherence to well-
established administrative rules and practices, one can hardly rely on
such legislation for the sort of transparent rules generally associated with
the "rule of law." The result has been that the legislative process in
these societies have amounted to invitations to bid rather than the ratifi-
cation of agreements already arrived at. In this setting, to insist on trans-
parency may be tantamount to foreclosing the possibility of transactions.
Since legislation is not a blueprint of a consensus already achieved, it is
to the administrative process that the lawyer must turn to have the deal
done. Formal legislation is not so much a statement of certain outcome
as it is a statement of hypothetical objectives. The function of law is not
so much to define the process by which such objectives are to be
achieved as to invite agility in the reconciliation of the potential methods
for achieving those objectives with the institutional constraints within
which all large organizations must function.
To say that the administrative processes by which privatization poli-
cies in these societies must be implemented is not transparent is thus not
to assert that law plays no role here, nor even to suggest that the role
played by law and lawyers in this setting is somehow inferior to the for-
mal conception of the "rule of'law." It is most certainly not to argue that
lawyers are unimportant. To the contrary, law broadly understood as a
social phenomenon, and lawyers as its agents, are active participants in
the process. The central point worth making here is that administrative
processes are born of institutional needs. They embody and reflect bu-
reaucratic responses to the demands of those interests that they are sup-
posed to serve. Thus, as institutional accommodations, administrative
processes are built up by accretion and adaptation. They are not shaped
by fiat.
Privatization may mark a revolutionary break with tradition, placing
new institutional demands on the bureaucracy. It is hardly surprising that
in this instance, Western lawyers, used to operating in a market-driven
economy, are resorted to for advice and representation by the state and
private parties alike. Where such counselling or representation is limited
to providing consultation, one can scarcely debate its rectitude. Anecdotal
evidence abounds, however, that the role of the Western legal practitioner
in these so-called transitional societies extends well beyond consultation
40. See e.g. Richard C. Schneider, Jr., Property and Small-Scale Privatization in
Russia, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 507, 513, n.23 (1993).
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and document drafting to include advising on and implementation of
wholesale institutional changes in the administrative state.4' The under-
taking of this task is particularly problematic given the interdependence
of economic institutions, on the one hand, and the necessity for staged
reform on the other. The remainder of this piece reflects on these points
in the context of the privatization process in sub-Saharan Africa, gener-
ally, and in Nigeria in particular.
IV. PRIVATIZING AFRICA'S ECONOMIES
Sub-Saharan Africa's economic performance during the last two de-
cades has been abysmal.42 Beginning with the reverberations of the 1973-
1974 quadrupling - virtually overnight - of the price of oil, whatever
dreams of economic prosperity these societies had entertained at the
dawn of their independence a decade and a half earlier were swept away
by the global inflationary effects of the oil price rise. For a while, these
effects were masked by the nominal increases in the price of other raw
commodities which formed the staple of African exports, the extension of
concessional credits to hard-pressed African countries by the newly en-
riched oil exporters and the international financial intermediaries awash
with "petro-dollars," and the sense of empowerment engendered by the
rhetoric of a "New International Economic Order." 43 With the second
oil-price shock of 1979, the ascendancy of conservative governments in
Britain and the United States (1979-1981), and the deflationary monetary
policies of Western governments in these years, Africa's economic for-
tunes plunged into the doldrums.
With the arguable exception of the small southern African country
of Botswana,44 every single sub-Saharan African country experienced rel-
41. See e.g. Douglas Webb, supra note 38. (In a presentation attended by this author
concerning Eastern Europe, an American lawyer described how his team had participated
directly in selecting from among Western bidders those who ought to participate in a joint
venture with the East European state.)
42. The term as an economic expression is derived from World Bank usage. See e.g.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH (1989).
43. See generally Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourd-
ing and Serving Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming in 1997); CHARLES
OKOLIE, THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979).
44. See e.g. PIERRE DE Torr, STATE BUILDING AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHERN AF-
RICA: BOTSWANA, ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA (1995); Don L. Boroughs & Kevin
Whitelaw, Where U.S. Aid Works, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 6, 1996, at 52;
John D. Holm, Democratization & Africa. Botswana: an African Success Story, CURRENT,
Oct. 1994, at 36; David L. Peterson, Debunking Ten Myths About Democracy in Africa,
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Summer, 1994, at 129. Compare William Easterly & Lant
Pritchett, The Determinants of Economic Success: Luck and Policy, FINANCE AND DEVEL-
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ative and absolute decline in the standard of living of the typical member
of its society during the 1980s.45 While civil war, drought, and internal
political instability accounted for some this underperformance, it was also
clear that pervasive economic mismanagement, the existence of poor in-
frastructure and the organizational incompetence of the state and its civil
servants contributed to the continent's woes. Finally, there was the issue
of the debt overhang. As was the case with Latin America, many African
countries had sought to meet the added burdens to their new economies
through extensive borrowings in the international financial markets. Un-
like Latin American countries, however, most of that borrowing came in
the form of concessional loans and stand-by arrangements with the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the various development
agencies of the wealthier industrialized countries. When capital dried up
in the 1980s, renegotiating these arrangements was a political as well as
an economic undertaking.
The role of the world Bank was particularly notable. With a history
of active involvement in project financing in Africa,4s the Bank aroused
much less visible hostility from Africa's political leaders and intelligent-
sia than did the IMF and foreign government's aid agencies such as the
U.S. Agency for International Development, or the British Overseas De-
velopment Council. Thus, it fell primarily to the World Bank to. imple-
OPMENT, December, 1993, at 38 ("[O]nly four countries [Botswana, Korea, Singapore,
and Taiwan, Province of China] were in the top one tenth of the growth rates in both
1960-73 and 1974-88").
The central point of these writings is effectively captured in the following snapshot:
"The land-locked African nation of Botswana, is predominantly wilderness and
'bush'. In fact 84% of the country's mass comprises the Kalahari desert and
Botswana ... [Yet] Botswana should not be measured with the same yardstick
that applies to some of the other countries of sub-saharan Africa. For it is not
the stereotypical poverty-stricken under-developed, one-party state or dictator-
ship. Rather, Botswana is an affluent, comparatively rich, strong and stable
multi-party democracy with a history of sensible government and carefully
planned development. As a result, it now has the fastest growing economy in
Africa."
Martin Warwick, Out of Africa; Botswana's Botspack X.25 Data Network, CoMMumcA-
TIONS INTERNAMONAL, Jan. 1994 at 58.
45. This is even true of three other often cited examples of "Africa's few success
stories" in the first half of the 1980's: Kenya, Cameroon and Cote D'Ivoire. In the case
of Nigeria, despite being an oil exporter generating revenue in-flows in excess of $200
billion between 1975-1995, the country sustained a real decline in per capita income of
over 10%. See e.g. World Bank Nigeria's Structural Adjustment Program at 73 (1994).
46. Of particular relevance here is the work of the International Development
Agency, an arm of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development which ex-
tends near-interest-free loans with exceptionally long maturities to the poorest countries.
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ment (or more correctly, to recommend the implementation of) "struc-
tural adjustment policies" in African countries.47
While the specifics of the policies varied from country to country,
their general tenor was clear. Paradoxically, African countries were asked
to use state power to reduce state involvement in the economic life of the
national society.4 These included reduction of the civil service work-
force, liberalization or reduction of licensing requirements for and tariffs
on imports, devaluation of the domestic currency, removal of price-
control regulations, improvement of tax collection mechanisms, and
above all, reduction of governmental subsidization of both production
and consumption. This last was the harbinger of privatization, for much
government subsidization occurred through surplus employment and bulk
purchases by parastatals.
One last catalyst propelled the acceptance of privatization in sub-
Saharan Africa. In the quest for "modernity" through economic growth,
African societies are remarkably nondiscriminatory in their choice of
means. More often than not, they have adopted the prevailing doctrine
with relatively little regard for the suitability of the policy for the histori-
cal, social or structural context of their societies. 49 Thus, in the early
1960s, the newly independent countries, despite their anticolonial politi-
cal ideology, accepted en masse the then dominant Keynesian "liberal in-
ternationalism" that assigned to the government the role of "priming the
pump" of economic growth. The government, while abstaining from di-
rect intervention, nonetheless made its influence felt through active fiscal
policies such as the creation of tax holidays for the benefit of preferred
"pioneer" industries) ° This approach was borrowed directly from the de-
parting colonial administrators, and was sponsored in large measure by
47. These policies were not unlike the "conditionality" terms insisted on by the
IMF as a prerequisite for access to IMF stabilization facilities. Indeed, in many countries,
the IMF, the World Bank, the "Paris Club" (an intergovernmental gathering of "lender
agencies), and the "London Club" (a borrower-country-specific gathering of private lend-
ers) often worked in tandem to restructure payments due from indebted countries. See
generally THoMAs J. BmRsTcER, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL NEGOTIATIONS (1992).
48. See e.g. Thomas J. Bierstecker, The Triumph of Neoclassical Economics in the
Developing World: Policy Convergence and Bases of Governance in the International Ec-
onomic Order, GOVERNANCE WrrHouT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD
PoLmcs, JAMES N. ROSENAU AND CzEmprL. EDS. at 108-110, 116-119.
49. For the development of this argument in the Nigerian context, see infra note 74
and accompanying text.
50. See e.g. Yltzak Hadari, The Role of Tax Incentives in Attracting Foreign Invest-
ments in Selected Developing Countries and the Desirable Policy, 24 INT'L LAW 121
(1990); Richard J. Faletti, Investing in Nigeria - The Law, Good Intentions, Illusion and
Substance, 5 J. INT'L Bus. 743 (1983).
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the new development consultants who were beginning to emerge as rec-
ognizable cadres in the international financial institutions and in aca-
demic circles in the U.S. and Britain. 51 In a pattern that was to be re-
peated all too frequently, little attention was devoted to establishing the
efficacy of these policies in the specific African environment into which
they were being introduced. How responsive to tax policies, for example,
was the establishment of basic manufactures? To what extent was the set-
ting up of these "pioneer industries" more likely to be influenced by la-
bor policies, import and export trade regimes, or political stability? These
issues were generally not thought to be pertinent because they had not
been prefigured in the British or French colonial experiences, in which
the latter factors had been taken as given, and not likely to vary.
Barely a decade later, the Keynesian policies were eclipsed by the
rhetoric of nationalism in economic development. Relying on theoretical
and doctrinal imports from Latin America, African countries sought to
pursue economic growth through policies of "import substitution indus-
trialization," and "nationalization" or "indiginization" of sectors of the
economy. Invoking the motif of centralized planning of the national
economy,52 African governments deluded themselves with the illusion
that the central government could effectively manipulate the economy to
yield specified results during identified periods of time. Little attention
was paid to the availability of the necessary managerial skills or of suffi-
cient internally generated savings to meet capital demands. Nor did these
policies take account of external shocks such as those represented by in-
flation in the price of oil and of manufactured imports, and of dramatic
declines in the terms of trade for the raw products that were the main ex-
ports of African economies.
As economic conditions became progressively worse in the 1970s
and 1980s, African polities looked more and more to staccatic-speaking
but intellectually ill-prepared junior military officers to fill the gaping
holes in national leadership. But young army officers fared no better in
dealing with Africa's economic problems than had its gerontocratic politi-
cians. Pervasive corruption, persistent hunger and famine, the continuing
rationing of basic necessities, high rates of unemployment, and the very
visible deterioration of basic educational, health and transportation infra-
structures made all too obvious the continent's economic plight.
51. See generally ANN 0. KRUGER, THE PoLmcAL ECONOMY OF Poucv REFORM IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRms (1993); PETER T. BAUER, REALITY AND RHETORIC: STUDIES IN THE
ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT (1981).
52. So complete was the importation of the idea that most plans mimicked the five
year period then common in Eastern Europe and South America.
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It was at this point that privatization appeared to African policymak-
ers as a viable tool of economic growth. Coming as a recommendation
from Western consultants or as a dictate of Western political leaders, it
might have been ignored. However, comrades in Latin America and in
perestroika Russia and Eastern Europe were grasping onto privatization
as a life-preserver. Moreover, the political environment between 1989-
1992 in Africa was remarkably restive. A population long quiescent and
seemingly capable of passively accepting the most atrocious misrule was
beginning to bestir itself, and to demand a voice in the choice of its lead-
ers.53 For those seeking power in the emerging new order, privatization
offered a distinctive and as yet untried policy proposal. Consonant with
emerging trends in other parts of the world, it promised the possibility of
unburdening the public fisc from the drain of funds that was the legacy
of the many ill-conceived public projects that were acquired in the 1970s.
Further, it had the added advantage of offering plausible sources of spoils
for the new power elite.
Privatization, in its various incarnations, was thus embraced by the
renascent Africa of the 1990s. 55 Not only did it find acceptance among
traditionally conservative polities like Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya and Nigeria,
but it was adopted by hitherto self-proclaimed socialist societies like
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Not surprisingly, some of its strongest
adherents were those societies that experienced revolutionary transforma-
tion such as Ethiopia and Eritrea. For these countries, privatization genu-
inely marked a symbolic break with the past, a means of obtaining for-
eign assistance from the West, and the possibility for a restructured and
differently functioning society.
The interactions of two entities most vividly demonstrated the com-
ing of age of this "second revolution" in Africa, and their fortunes raise
the question of its survival. In Zambia, in 1992, the twenty-five-year-old
one-party rule of Dr. Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence
Party (UNIP) came to an unexpected end when it was defeated in the
first multiparty elections in over twenty years by Chiluba's Movement
for Multiparty Democracy.5 6 Ostensibly a life-long trade unionist, Mr.
53. See generally JENNIFER WIDENFR, ED., ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL LIBER-
ALIZATION IN AFRICA (1994).
54. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text. The forms of privatization in Af-
rica are more fully developed in the Nigerian context in Part IV, infra.
55. See generally RExioRD A AMINE & BERNARD KATz, EDs., PRIVATIZATION AND
INvETMENT IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA (1991).
56. The Washington Post accurately represented the dominant view of Western jour-
nalists when it trumpeted that:
Frederick Chiluba's victory in Zambia's first multi-party elections in nearly 20
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Chiluba had campaigned for power by denouncing not only President
Kaunda's "one-party dictatorship," but more particularly the inherent
corruptibility of the system given the concentration of economic power in
the "nondemocratic" state. The answer that newly elected President
Chiluba prescribed was the "market," and more particularly "privatiza-
tion," especially of the copper industry, Zambia's primary foreign ex-
change earner.57
In this recommendation, President Chiluba was abetted by Mr.
Sardonis, a banker who, through his Meridian-BIAO Bank, headquartered
in Zambia, sought to create the first privately-owned Africa-based com-
mercial banking concern. Mr. Sardonis saw his bank as a vehicle for fi-
nancing privatization programs throughout the continent.
By 1995, however, this alliance of new politics and new capital had
foundered. Zambia's democratic experiment was faltering, and Meridian-
BIAO had failed. Employing the standard legal formalism of dictatorial
rule, Mr. Chiluba was engaged in the task of "amending" the Zambian
Constitution to ensure that his control over governmental power could
not be effectively challenged by the one person capable of defeating him
in a genuinely free and fair election: Mr. Kaunda. To this end, the Zam-
bian Constitution was to be amended to preclude any Zambian both of
whose parents were not born in Zambia (or more accurately, the British
colonial protectorate of Northern Rhodesia) from holding the office of
the President.58 Meanwhile, the vaunted privatization of Zambia's copper
years stands as a new high water mark in an extraordinary process of democra-
tization in Africa that began in earnest in Zambia and other nations several
years ago. Fed up with corrupt, single-party states and military regimes largely
lacking in accountability, Africans have arisen in numerous lands in recent
years to fight for greater freedom and better representation in their governments.
Neil Henry, Kaunda Graciously Bows to "Verdict": Zambian President of 27 Years
Leaves as Successor Sworn In, WASH. POST, Nov. 3., 1991 at 21. See also Michael A.
Hiltzick, Voters Oust Kaunda, Zambia's Leader Since '64, Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 2,
1991 at 6, ("ITihe election stands as the most important victory so far for multiparty de-
mocracy in mainland sub-Saharan Africa, not least because Thursday's voting was con-
ducted peacefully without any of the chaos and rioting that have marred such exercises in
Gabon, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast... Democracy is a key issue in the region because
many development officials and Western diplomats argue that Africa's widespread author-
itarianism was contributed heavily to its economic decline and political stagnation.");
Jane Perlez, With Pride and Economic Pain Ahead, Zambia Swears in New Leader, NEw
YORK TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991 at 3.
57. See e.g. Colleen Lowe Morana, Zambia; Privatization, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Sept. 1995 at S10.
58. See e.g. Zambian Government May Deport Ex-President as Illegal Alien, N. Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1995 at A7; Lynne Duke, Zambian Faces Difficult Reelection Campaign;
Chiluba, Who Ousted Longtime Strongman, Is Now Accused of Backpedaling on Democ-
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industry has stalled.59
As for Mr. Sardonis' dream of an Africa-based continent-wide bank-
ing entity financing the revolution in privatization, it ended with the liq-
uidation of Meridian-BIAO, and at no small cost to the already-
impoverished governments of such countries as Tanzania, Kenya, Swazi-
land, and Zambia. 60
Nor can the Chiluba and Meridian-BIAO stories be viewed as iso-
lated failures. Whatever the initial reception of Africa's "Second Revolu-
tion," it is clear that by 1995, views had become highly polarized about
the value and efficacy of the privatization process. Neither electoral polit-
ics nor the market offered the self-evident routes out of Africa's misfor-
tunes that they had promised half a decade earlier. In much of the conti-
nent, privatization was being equated with the all-too-familiar prior
experience of the politically powerful and economically well-off appro-
priating national wealth for "personal development." Increasingly, labor
unions are demanding reconsideration of privatization programs.61
racy, WASH. POST, July 25, 1996 at A22; Zambia: Kaunda says In News Conference He
Will Fight Chiluba, Government, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Aug. 12, 115
(available on Lexis/Nexis BBCSWB File); Judith Matloff, Zambia's New Democracy
Takes Big Step Backward, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 7, 1996, at 6.
For a nonpartisan Zambian's statement on Chiluba's form of "democratic rule", see
generally Fred M'membe, Zambia's New President "Fathers" Orphan Democracy: Free-
dom of Speech One of Many Rights Ignored by Election Winners, WORLDPAPER, Nov.
1995 at 6.
59. See e.g. Lynne Duke, Disaffected In Zambia: Citizens Caught by Economic Ills,
Power Struggle, WAsH. POST, Sept. 12, 1995 at A12; Karl Maier, Zambia Feels Chill of
the Free Market, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 9, 1994 at 16.
60. See e.g. Joel Kibazo, SA Bank Acquires Swaziland Side of Meridian BIAO, FI-
NANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 12, 1995 at 28; Jowie Mwiinga, Zambia-Economy: Golden Goose
Lays Copper Eggs, IrER PRESS SERVICE, July 19, 1995 (available on Lexis in Middle
East and Africa Library, Allnews File); Buchizya Mseteka, Kenya Central Bank Shuts
Down Meridian Bank Branch, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Mar. 14, 1995.
61. See e.g. Alan Morris, South Africa: Privatization Plans Test Tripartite Alliance,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 15, 1996 (available in Westlaw, Magsplus Database)
("[d]ebates around privatization are going to challenge the strength of the tripartite alli-
ance of the African National Congress, the South African Communist party, and the Con-
gress of South African Trade Unions. The latter two have expressed clear opposition to
privatization.") Compare R. Stephen Brent, Tough Road to Prosperity: Slow Economic
Growth Under South Africa's New Government, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March 1996 ("Unfor-
tunately, the labor unions, which fear job losses and have recently threatened strikes,
have hamstrung all privatization options. In this field, the government cannot afford to
bow to an interest group, even one that played an important role in an anti-apartheid
struggle. The interests of the unions are at odds with the national interest, and a hard
choice has to be made.")
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Thus, as Africa marches to the end of the millennium, an issue of
central concern is whether Ashanti Goldfields or Meridian-BIAO typifies
the future that lies ahead. Is privatization any more likely to survive as a
tool of national economic growth than had prior experiments in import
substitution, indiginization and export processing zones? Above all, to
what extent is the outcome likely to be influenced by law and legal
developments?
I propose to explore these issues and to offer some tentative answers
by looking at the privatization process in Nigeria. While the Nigerian ex-
ample may not be archetypal, it has the merit of being based on a fully
constructed legal regime. To this extent, it epitomizes the strengths and
weaknesses of a law-based privatization process within the constraints of
a sub-Saharan African polity. Exploring the Nigerian privatization scheme
thus exposes to scrutiny the relevance of law - formal and practical
in the institutionalization of a process of economic growth.
V. NIGERIA'S PRIVATIZATION EXPERIENCE
With a population in excess of 100 million, Nigeria is easily Af-
rica's most populous country, being at least twice as large as any of the
other countries, and comprising almost one-fifth of the continent's entire
population. This potential wealth of human resources, together with its
significant capacity to produce crude oil, has made it a bellwether of de-
velopments in sub-Saharan Africa. Always self-conscious of this position,
Nigeria's leaders have sought to tailor their policies not only to meet in-
ternal demands, but also to accord with their perception of external ex-
pectations. The consequence is that in many ways, Nigeria's economic
policies and political missteps have foreshadowed or magnified trends in
other sub-Saharan African countries.62 This has been the case with
62. The seeming paradox of Nigeria's uniqueness among sub-Saharan countries in
terms of access to resources, and yet its representativeness as a mirror of the plights of
those countries, is only superficial. Reliance on crude oil, while different in degree, is in
kind not much different from reliance on other primary extractive products. Such reliance
is subject to the booms and busts that are brought on by the cyclical buffeting winds of
international commodity prices and over which these nations have no control. Moreover,
the administrative regimes in these countries appear totally unequipped to implement poli-
cies that would smooth out some of the effects of these peaks and troughs. Thus, al-
though Nigeria's experience with crude oil certainly differed in its particulars from those
of non-oil producing sub-Saharan African countries, it paralleled in its essential contours
the experiences of Ghana and Cote D'Ivoire with cocoa, or of Zaire and Zambia with
copper. Substantial primary export-generated revenue windfalls to the central government
resulted in the atrophying of internal tax-collection mechanisms, the strengthening of cen-
tral governmental power, and the depletion of any reserves of internal revenue-raising ca-
pacity to pick up the slack when commodity prices fell. The result was that external debts
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privatization.
The privatization process in Nigeria was commenced officially with
the adoption of a formal legal instrument, Decree No. 25 of July 16,
1986, which (1) stated the objectives of the program; (2) created a highly
structured implementing regime; (3) purported to identify with specificity
the enterprises to be privatized; and (4) outlined the rights and obliga-
tions of the privatized entities. These provisions, however, and their sub-
sequent enforcement, must be construed against the background of the
country's internal politics and economic difficulties in the second half of
the 1980s.
A. Prelude to Privatization
Like virtually all sub-Saharan African countries, Nigeria's post-
independence history has been beset by two core problems: how to create
a nation state whose government is stable and accountable to the people;
and how to promote economic growth and social well-being. In an at-
tempt to provide answers to both, the country has fared extremely poorly
as its leaders and its intelligentsia have veered from one policy to an-
other in an effort to ride whatever wave seemed to be cresting. For the
first half-dozen years following independence, electoral politics and a
noninterventionist liberal economic order appeared to provide optimal so-
lutions. A federal constitutional democratic regime tightly balanced by
competing regional and ethnic loyalties encouraged private economic ac-
tivities and used fiscal policies as a lure for both domestic and foreign
investments. Regional governments vied with one another in creating
"industrial estates," and the central government granted "tax holidays"
to "pioneer" industries.
Civil political competition broke down in 1966 when young army
officers, disenchanted with the results of the democratic experiment,
seized power and abolished multiparty politics. In the ensuing four years
of political instability - including a civil war - no dominant economic
ideology emerged.
By the early 1970s, a new political structure had become rooted in
Nigeria. This "diarchy" consisted of a nominally military-led govern-
ment that was for most practical purposes run by a highly self-confident
technocratic elite. Insulated from public pressure by the facade of mili-
tary rule, and fortified by the accelerating increase of revenues from
crude oil production, these "civilian commissioners" and "Super Perma-
contracted on the basis of income flow during good times became major bottlenecks to
national expenditure and political independence when international commodity prices
dropped.
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nent Secretaries" who had met each other in the handful of boarding
"government colleges" and "missionary secondary schools," or in the
burgeoning "Nigerianized Civil Service" of the late '50s and '60s went
about restructuring the economy with little interference from the remain-
der of the polity. Two aspects of the restructuring are particularly note-
worthy. First, the central government assumed a dominant role in di-
recting the economic life of the country.63 Abandoning the previous
principle of governance by which regions taxed economic activities
within their geographical sphere, the new technocratic intelligentsia cen-
tralized revenue collection, and doled it out to the newly created states
(itself a means of enhancing central power at the expense of the regions)
on the criteria of "need" and "derivation," the determinations of which
were made on ad hoc bases and were subject to virtually no external
control. Retaining the bulk of the revenues for itself, the central govern-
ment moved away from a regulatory stance and began to invest directly
in the economy. National five year plans, crafted by the central govern-
ment, rather than being limited to indicative statements of the society's
economic objectives and means, outlined in quite comprehensive terms
projected industrial and agricultural expenditures as well as social con-
sumption and savings, much of which were to be financed by the central
government.6
63. One measure of this shift in the role of the central government is reflected by
the increase in the proportion of capital expenditure in federal government expenditures
net of transfers to the states from 44% in 1973 to 82% in 1977. See TOM FORREsT, PoLrr-
ICS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA at 134 (updated ed. 1996). Strikingly, ac-
cording to Forrest, the overall share of federal expenditures as a percentage of gross do-
mestic product rose from 19% in 1973 to 54% in 1978. Id. at 147. Although much of this
increase is accounted for by the rise in current expenditures including the tripling of the
federal services (excluding military) payroll from $0.5 million in 1973 to over $1.5 mil-
lion in 1983, the period is particularly noteworthy for the sizeable direct federal capital
investments. Not only did the government invest in such strategic sectors as oil and steel,
but also in the mundane mercantile industries of cargo handling and freight forwarding.
Id. at 149. In addition, it invested as well in such manufacturing industries as cement, car
and truck assembling, pulp and paper production, fertilizer plants, wood and furniture
production, sugar and salt refining, machine tools, production of electric meters and trans-
formers, and the distilling of yeast and alcohol. Id. at 140. Yet, as Mr. Forrest observes,
while such investments gave the state monopoly ownership in some areas - notably the
production of fertilizer, salt, pulp and paper - "[olverall, the state never came near to
constituting a dominant force in manufacturing." Id.
64. See e.g. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FINANCE. LAGOS, NIGERiA; GUtN s FOR THE
SEcoND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN. 1971-1975 (1971); FEDERAL MNmSTRY OF E)-
NOMIC PLANNING GuIDELNEs FOR THE THIRD NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN: 1976-1980
(1976); FEDERAL MmSTRY OF NATIONAL PLANNING GuiDEUNES FOR THE FOuRTH DEvEL-
oPMEr PLAN. 1981-1985 (1981).
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Second, in keeping with the evolving trend in the international
arena, the Nigerian intelligentsia sought to "indiginize" or "Nigerianize"
the economy. The economy was divided into sectors that were segmented
in terms of level of ownership by Nigerian nationals. Thus, for example,
enterprises engaged in the retail of basic household consumables with
relatively small capitalization had to be wholly owned by Nigerians,
while substantial foreign ownership was acceptable only in those sectors
involving large capital investments and superior technological know-
how.6
Direct governmental ownership of industrial assets - especially by
the central government - satisfied both policy objectives. The control
implicit in such ownership strengthened the role of the central govern-
ment vis-a-vis other institutions within the society; and such ownership
was explained away as necessarily in trust for the Nigerian people who,
individually, lacked the resources for direct personal ownership.66
A military "palace coup" in 1975 began the gradual disempowering
of the narrow technocratic elite that had dominated policy-making in Ni-
geria since the end of the civil war in 1970.67 This process was acceler-
ated with the return to civil rule in 1979. Coincident with that return to
civil rule was the second boom in oil prices, which generated substantial
revenue for Nigeria. However, this wealth was speedily dissipated by the
new political leaders, who employed it haphazardly to maintain personal
power through a remarkably corrupt patronage system." This led to the
65. See generally THOMAS J. BRSTRcKER, MULTINATIONALS: THE STATE AND CON-
TROL OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY (1987) (reviewing the 1972 and 1977 indiginization
programs).
66. As will be developed below in supra note 124 and accompanying text, direct
governmental ownership of assets has been favored by many members of the ruling elite
in the northern part of the country as a means of counterbalancing perceived northern dis-
advantage in individualized competition for the accumulation of social capital. Thus, the
New Nigerian, a newspaper that explicitly articulates the preferences of many members of
that elite, in 1977 editorialized that state governments should be allocated 50% of all
shares transferred under the Second Indiginization program. THE NEw NiGERN, Mar. 1,
1977, cited in FORREST, supra note 63 at 156.
67. One illustration of the consequence of the military's effort to chart a new direc-
tion for Nigeria is the series of cases brought in courts in Western Europe and the United
States against the Nigerian government for its refusal to honor contracts entered into by
the previous government. See e.g. Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (1980).
68. See e.g. CHNUA ACHEBE, THE TROUBLE Wrm NiGERA (1983). Accurately char-
acterizing this period, Tom Forrest has suggested that the name of the ruling party (the
"National Party of Nigeria") was a misnomer, and that it should have been called "the
Party of National Patronage." See FORREST, supra note 63 at 134. See generally id. Chap-
ter 8. Compare Nigeria Under Shagari Called Garden of Graft, N.Y. TnEs, Jan. 20,
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misuse of national funds in the purchase and construction of uneconomic
projects such as steel mills, petrochemical plants and irrigation dams that
were then mismanaged.69 Although the central government became in-
creasingly involved in the economic life of the country through direct
ownership of assets, its purpose and uses of these assets were devoid of
economic rationality or political ideology; other than possibly self-
perpetuation.
The country was thus ineffectual in dealing with the pressures
placed on it by the deflationary responses of the West to the second oil
crisis, and with the dramatic decline in the price of oil that ensued. The
drain on the national treasury of the cost of running the new national ac-
quisitions became severe, and access to foreign capital markets dried up
as the country's external debt ballooned. Meanwhile, the same political
considerations that had fueled extensive governmental acquisitions made
it politically inopportune for the government to adopt conservative fiscal
policies, or to allow a devaluation of the currency to reflect the country's
worsening trade imbalances.
In the ensuing inflationary environment, there was yet another
seizure of power by the military hierarchy, which asserted as its purpose,
the restoration of "discipline" and the removal of "corruption" from the
society.70 The military attempted to meet these objectives through draco-
nian measures with significant impingements on civil liberties. In a coun-
try which, notwithstanding years of military rule, had never been tolerant
of nor exposed to harsh dictatorial measures, it was hardly surprising that
there was yet another palace coup in August 1985.71 The timing of the
1984, at 1 (attempting to link the broad African patronage practice that "someone who
becomes rich and powerful uses-and is expected to use-his position to benefit not only
himself but also his family, his clan, his village, his tribe and, if he has the means, even
his region" with widespread incidents of unchecked misappropriation of public property
in Nigeria.)
69. See generally DAviD GivHAN. PAUL CoLumR & JAN W. GUNNING, NIGERIA PoL-
ICY RESPONSES TO SHocKs, 1970-1990 (International Center for Economic Growth Coun-
try Studies, Nov. 11, 1992).
70. See e.g. Blaine Harden, Military Ousts Government Out of Nigeria, WASH. POST,
Aug. 28, 1985 at Al; Charles Mohr, Nigeria Coup 7ied to Lack of Power Sharing, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 3, 185, at 10; Gregory Copley, Nigeria's New Bid for Political and Eco-
nomic Recovery, DEFENSE AND FoaIGN AFFAMS, Oct. 1985 at 36.
71. See e.g. Michael Holman, Army Seeks to Match Expectations to Means, FINAN-
ciAL TIMES, Feb. 25, 1985, §3, at 2; Charles T. Powers, Nigeria's Optimism Sinks With
Oil Price, LA. TimES, Feb. 23, 1986, at 2; Blaine Harden, note 70.
According to one observer, "[t]he need for a highly authoritarian form of rule [in
Nigeria] was obviated both by the weak fragmented nature of the opposition [to military
rule] and the control over the top-down distribution of resources." See TOM FORREST,
PoLrrics AND DEVELOPMENr IN SoUTH AFRiCA 254 (1996).
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coup, however, could hardly have been worse; for it coincided with the
free fall of crude oil prices which followed the Group of 7's "Plaza Ac-
cord" with concomitant dramatic effects on the crude oil export-
dependent Nigerian economy.
The IMF offered Nigeria access to its stabilization facilities condi-
tioned, of course, on satisfactory negotiation of significant structural ad-
justment policies. The new military government, promising transparency
in government decision-making, "submitted" the issue to "popular de-
bate." In the ensuing national debate, which was generally unmoderated,
freewheeling and most certainly open, it became evident that the outspo-
ken sentiment in the nation was against IMF compelled "structural ad-
justment." T Faced with this apparent rejection of its policies, the govern-
ment declined formally to enter into a stand-by arrangement with the
IMF, but nonetheless instituted a "made-in-Nigeria" structural adjust-
ment policy, on the basis of which Nigeria was able to obtain substantial
lending from the World Bank. 3 Nigeria's privatization program was an
integral component of this "made-in-Nigeria" structural adjustment
policy.
B. Nigeria's Privatization Program
As an introduction to Nigeria's privatization program, it is important
to emphasize that participation in the national economy through direct as-
set ownership was not the product of a commitment to any of the stan-
dard ideologies of "socialism" or "Marxism," but rather reflected hap-
hazard decisions driven by the availability of funds and the political
exigencies of a very divided society for which the proper distribution of
72. For a succinct summary of the line-up of the national debate, see TOM FoRREST,
supra note 71 at 209-10. Compare Jonathan Friedland, Inching Back into the IMF Line:
The New Babangida Government Targets Nigerian Economic Growth, THE AMERICAN
BANKER, Oct. 2, 1985 at 17 (prematurely concluding that Nigeria's year long, often acri-
monious impasse with the IMF may soon be over, apparently on the ground that some
people viewed the August 1985 palace coup as an "IMF Banker's coup"). See also
Blaine Harden, Nigerian Coup's Leader Held Eager for Economic Arrogance, WASH.
PosT, Aug, 29, 1985 at A27 ("[aiccording to Western diplomats and international bankers
... Bagangida... is known to be more willing than Buhari to negotiate a much-delayed
agreement with the [ME").
73. The World Bank offered $4.2 billion over three years to fund Nigeria's Struc-
tural Adjustment Program, financing that was conditioned on progress in the country's
policy reform. See FORREST, supra note 71 at 212. The failure formally to reach a
standby arrangement with the IMF was not, however, without substantial cost. Aside from
the fact that direct access to IMF financing was thereby precluded, it also contributed sig-
nificantly to the failure of the scheduling of the country's substantial international indebt-
edness. Id.
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economic assets was conceived as centrally related to nation-building.
There were thus four features of the government's direct acquisition of
ownership in assets.
First, the availability of funds dictated the timing and nature of the
acquisitions. Significant government acquisitions did not begin until after
the surpluses generated by the first oil price rise of the early to mid-
1970s, and these were generally of medium-capitalized enterprises such
as flour mills, beer breweries, and the like. With the second oil price in-
creases of the late 1970s, government ownership expanded to heavy in-
dustries such as steel mills, petrochemicals, and the like.
Second, given that the predominant source of income for these ac-
quisitions was oil revenues which flow to the central government, it was
this, rather than state or local governments that made the most significant
acquisitions.
Third, for political reasons, many of the central government's acqui-
sitions were presented as being made "in trust" either for the state or lo-
cal governments, or for specific Nigerians. Thus, for example, under both
the 1972 and 1977 indiginization programs,74 there was usually insuffi-
cient private capital to meet the politically determined percentage of
Nigerian ownership. In these instances, the federal government made the
purchases ostensibly with a view to selling the acquired assets to individ-
ual Nigerians when they had saved up enough to pay for the property.
The relevance of these factors is that although Nigeria's privatization
program was a forced one, its form reflected the impulses embedded in
the foregoing factors.
Nigeria's privatization program was ushered in by a formal legal
document: Decree No. 25 of July, 1988. 75 The decree provided for "full
or partial privatization" of 110 entities, 76 and for the "full or partial
commercialization" of 35 additional entities.77 The enterprises to be
privatized or commercialized were specifically identified, as was the
level of government ownership to be retained following privatization. 78
74. See THOMAS J. BiERsmcKER, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NIGERIAN
STATE (1987).
75. See SuPPLEMENT TO OFFICIAL GAzErrE EXTRAORDINARY, no. 42, vol. 75, 6th of
July, 1988, Part A. "Privatization and Commercialization Decree No. 25, 1988" (Hereaf-
ter, "Privatization and Commercialization Decree").
76. See Schedule I accompanying the Privatization Decree. Section 1.3 of the De-
cree further provided that "[t]he President, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, may
by order published in the Gazette at any time, alter, modify, delete from or amend any of
the enterprises listed in schedule I to this decree so as to alter the category to which any
enterprise belongs."
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Other than the assertion that defense-related enterprises were excluded, it
is difficult to divine the guiding principles behind the'selection of the
146-odd entities out of the 600 possible candidates 79 for privatization or
commercialization.10 On the other hand, there seems little doubt that one
of the intended functions of "partial" privatization was to rationalize the
level of government ownership within sectors. Thus, in specialized bank-
ing (e.g. mortgage, industrial development and longterm credit banking),
federal government ownership was to be limited to 70% ownership of
relevant enterprises across the board.8' With regard to oil-marketing (as
distinguished from prospecting, transportation or refining), the govern-
ment ownership, which had varied depending on the expediency of joint
venture arrangements, was to be uniformly reduced to 40%.12 A limit of
40% ownership was also projected in such diverse industries as steel roll-
ing mills, 3 air and shipping lines,84 fertilizer companies,8 5 paper mills,8s
and sugar companies.8 Such rationalization of ownership does not, how-
ever, explain the projected ownership of cement companies, which
ranged from 30% to 10% following privatization."'
Among the entities to be fully privatized was a haphazard assort-
ment of entities notable more for the fact that the government had ever
79. See also Encouraging Private Sector Initiative: Excerpts from the Paper
Presented by Shasudeen Usman, WEST AFRICA MAGAZINE, 1929, 1930 (Dec. 11, 1995)
("[a]ccording to a 1993 TCPC survey of public enterprises in Nigeria, there were some
574 public enterprises owned by the Federal Government wholly or partly ... But only
145 were covered by the ongoing privatization and the commercialization exercise under
Decree No. 25 of 1988.") Moreover, these figures do not include the over 250 parastatals
owned or controlled by individual state governments which are not covered by the feder-
ally sponsored privatization scheme. Compare Paul M. Lubeck and Michael J. Watts, An
Alliance of Oil and Maize: The Response of Indigenous and State Capital to Structural
Adjusiment in Nigeria, AFRICAN CAPITALISTS IN AFmCAN DEVELOPMENT (1994), at 216.
80. As explained below, the government did not adhere strictly to the schedule. The
precise number of entities privatized, commercialized or liquidated outright remains the
focus of some disagreement. Some entities, notably the country's four major commercial
banks, which were not originally scheduled for privatization, did subsequently become
privatized, although the wisdom of this decision is now being questioned, and there are
indications that they may revert to direct governmental ownership or control.
81. See GuIDELINES ON PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT
ENTERPRISEs, (REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITrEE ON PRIVATIZATION AND COMMER-
CIALIZATION. July, 1993) Schedule I, items 1-4.
82. Id. Items 6-8.
83. Id. Items 9-11.
84. Id. Items 12-13.
85. Id. Items 14-15.
86. Id. Items 16-18.
87. Id. Items 19-21.
88. See id. Items 22-26.
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deemed it important to acquire any interest in them rather than for the
fact of their divestiture.8 9 These included a tourist promotion service and
several hotels,90 two textile mills,91 an inland water transportation com-
pany,92 a cargo handling company, 93 a variety of food producing, process-
ing or marketing companies,94 oil-palm plantations,9" wood and pulp
companies, 96 yeast and alcohol fermentation,97 a film processing com-
pany,98 a boatyard,99 beer brewing companies and distilleries, I' ° construc-
tion and engineering companies,' 0' life and casualty insurance compa-
nies, 102 and a flour mill. 103
While it is possible to draw a rough distinction between entities to
be privatized from those to be commercialized along the conventional
axis of openly competitive enterprises versus public utilities,1°4 the ratio-
nale behind the choice among the latter as to what was be "fully" or
only "partially" commercialized was less evident. Among those entities
that were to be fully commercialized were the Nigerian National Petro-
leum Company (with responsibility for crude oil exploration, production
sharing arrangements and distribution), coal and other ore-based mining
companies, Nigerian Telecommunications, Ltd. (which handles interna-
tional telephone calls), the Nigerian seaport authority, federal real estate
(including buildings and parks) management authorities, and employee
pension-related insurance companies. 1°5
89. As explained previously, the acquisition of these entities reflected the flow of
oil-money into governmental coffers, and the technocratic impulse to view economic de-
velopment in terms of the acquisition or development of physical assets. See supra notes
73-74 and accompanying text.
90. GUIDELINES ON PRIVATIZATION AND COMIERCiaLIZATION, supra note 81, Items
27, 54.
91. Id. Items 28, 76.
92. Id. Item 29.
93. Id. Item 30.
94. See id. Items 32-40, 70, 73.
95. Id. Items 47-48, 71-72.
96. Id. Items 41-43.
97. Id. Item 44.
98. Id. Item 44.
99. Id. Item 46.
100. Id. Items 51-52.
101. Id. Items 49-50, 53.
102. Id. Items 56-69.
103. Id. Item 75.
104. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
105. See GUIDELINES ON PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 81,
Schedule 11I.
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The entities to be only "partially" commercialized included the
Nigerian Airport authority, Nigerian Railways Corporation, the National
Electric Power Authority, the Nigerian Security Printing and Minting
Co., the federal government controlled radio and television services, the
national news agency, and several "river basin development authorities"
that had been created to act as catalysts and to channel funds for eco-
nomic growth in surrounding areas. 1' 6 But this list also included two steel
plants,"0 the Federal Housing Authority,'0 a national park,109 and a ma-
chine-tools company." 0
For the Nigerian government, privatization amounted simply to the
"disinvestment by the federal government of... its ordinary sharehold-
ing in a designated enterprise," with the distinction between "full" and
"partial" privatization depending on whether the divestiture of common
share ownership is complete."' Notably, this definition meant that the
government could retain some form of ownership or control in a fully
privatized entity. Indeed, the government made it clear at the time of
privatization that it would reserve to itself the right to have the so-called
"golden share" in a fully privatized entity.t 12
The decree defined "commercialization" as "the reorganization of
enterprises wholly or partly owned by the federal military government in
which such commercialized enterprises shall operate as profit-making
commercial ventures and without subventions from the federal military
government"." 3 The implementing regulations distinguished between
"full" and "partial" commercialization on the ground that
Full commercialization means that enterprises so designated will
be expected to operate profitably on a commercial basis, and be
able to raise funds from the capital market without government
guarantee. Such enterprises are expected to use private sector
procedures in running their businesses, and may, subject to the
106. Id. Schedule IV.
107. Ajaokuta Steel Co., Ltd., and Delta Steel Co., Ltd. Id.
108. Id.
109. Kainji Lake National Park. Id.
110. Id.
111. See GUIDELINES ON PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 81,
definitions (a) and (b). Compare PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION DECREE, supra
note 75, Art. 14.
112. See e.g. "cImicAL CommrrEE ON PRiVATATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION,
SECOND PROGRESS REPORT (1990). See also Nigeria: Appraising Privatisation, REuTER
TaxTrt. Jan. 8, 1991 (available on Lexis/Nexis Middle East and Africa Library, Nigeria
File).
113. PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION DECREE, supra note 75, Art. 14.
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general regulatory powers of the federal government, (1) fix
rates, prices and charges for goods rendered; (2) capitalize assets;
(3) sue and be sued in their corporate names.' 4
Partially commercialized entities, on the other hand, "will be expected to
generate enough revenues to cover their operating expenditures. The
Government may consider giving them capital grants to finance their
capital intensive projects."" 5
The decree sets out a formally transparent mode for both privatiza-
tion and commercialization. For this purpose, it created an "independent
commission" (the "Technical Committee on Privatization and Commer-
cialization," or "TCPC"), a technocratic body statutorily answerable
only to the President of the country rather than to any member of the
cabinet or to the civil service.' 6 While the TCPC was given broad lati-
tude in determining the best method for privatizing or commercializing
each enterprise (whether by sale of stock, sale of assets, private place-
ment, divestiture to management or to employees, and so on)," 7 that dis-
cretion was sought to be checked in part by the requirement that another
ostensibly independent agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
determine the valuation and pricing of publicly-made stock offerings,"'
and asset prices were to be determined by independent professional ac-
countants and appraisers." 9
Yet, political considerations were not entirely absent even from the
face of the formal legislation. All final decisions of the TCPC with re-
gard to any enterprise had to be submitted for approval to the Federal
Military Government,'1" which apparently retained the authority not only
to give or withhold consent, but to modify the transaction.' 2 ' Further-
more, the decree expressly instructed the TCPC to ensure regional (i.e.
ethnic) balance in the distribution of privatized assets.'2 Where necessary
to assure such balance, sales of shares or assets in "privatizing" enter-
prises could be made to state or local governments (presumably as parens
patriae) who would purchase such assets in trust for subsequent resale to
114. Id. Art. 13.
115. Id.
116. Id. Arts. 3 and 4.
117. See e.g. id. Art. 4.
118. Id. Art 4.1(d). See also Decree No. 29 of 1988.
119. TECHmCAL CommrrrE ON PRIVATZATION AND COMMERCALzATON, S.COND
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 112.
120. PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION DECREE, supra note 75, Art. 4.4.
121. Id. Art. 4.5.
122. Id. ArL 7. See also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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citizens. 123 This provision is especially significant because since the civil
war, Nigerian social and economic expenditures have been substantially
influenced by the explicit use of ethnic and regionally-based quotas in all
aspects of government-sponsored programs, from admissions to educa-
tional institutions to the financing of development projects. 124
Notable for its omission from the decree was any provision relating
to foreign participation in the privatization process. Although the decree
does not exclude such participation, the lack of any explicit endorsement
or encouragement of such mechanisms as debt for equity swaps, foreign
partner joint ventures, export processing zones, and the like is striking
given the backdrop against which it was promulgated - a foreign debt
whose servicing demanded close to one-third of all export earnings.125
Similarly, although the unavailability of lending on commercial terms
from international banks, and hence the need for access to World Bank
and/or IMF lending with their imposed structural adjustment conditionali-
123. Id. Art 7.2. See also GUIDEuNES ON PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION,
supra note 81. Tom Forrest has asserted that "concern that particular ethnic groups or
sectional interests in the country might be favored by the [privatization] exercise" was a
key factor in shaping the thrust and speed of privatization. See FORREST, supra note 63 at
224.
124. A TCPC employee explained the operating philosophy in the following
manner.
Because of the political nature of the [privatization and commercialization] pro-
gram itself, because it is not essentially an economic program. Nigeria is a
complex polity, and you have to take into consideration the general needs of the
polity, itself, and be able to satisfy sections that make up the polity, such that
the government would not be accused of (1) what you might call a 'partiality'
in the disbursement of these shares. Secondly, to be able to create wider share
ownership, geographically speaking, taking into cognizance the need to create a
feeling of belonging in the general exercise. We did not want to create a situa-
tion whereby like it happened in the former indiginization process wide sections
of Nigerians felt cheated out of the program... If shares were on offer, we en-
sured that certain percentage went to each state of the federation. It was left
then to the states, especially under the banking directives to either take up the
shares on offer allotted to them, or they left it for future off loadment on the
floor of the stock exchange.
(Interview with TCPC official by author, July 30, 1993) (recording available from au-
thor). See also FoRRsr, supra note 63 at 224 and N. 37 (documenting the position of the
Kano Section of the Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria, which called for the use of
"quotas and controls" to assure "regional equity" in the privatization process).
125. But see PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION DECREE, supra note 75, Art.
4.2 (g) (obligating the TCPC to "[elnsure the success of the privatization and commer-
cialization exercise, taking into account the need for balance and meaningful participation
by Nigerians and foreign interests in accordance with relevant laws of Nigeria.") On the
cost of servicing Nigeria's foreign debt in the late 1980's, see generally BIVAN, COLLMER
AND GUNNING, supra note 69.
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ties,'26 and the emerging global climate of hospitality towards foreign
capital were instrumental considerations for the policy makers, they are
not accounted for by the design of the privatization policies.' 7 Further,
there was no effort in the decree to harmonize the privatization process
to other laws with which it clearly had resonance. Thus, the indiginiza-
tion decrees and foreign exchange laws remained on the books, seem-
ingly unaltered by these trade and investment liberalizing policies, even
if they were hardly enforced.12
C. Implementation
There were three distinct phases to the implementation of the priva-
tization program, and it is in this aspect, more than in the text, that one
finds the close interrelationship between economic objectives and politi-
cal means.
Phase I ran roughly from promulgation of the decree in 1986 to the
end of 1989. This phase was characterized primarily by inaction. Be-
tween 1986 and 1988, there was no indication that the privatization was
any more than a moribund governmental pronouncement. In 1988, fol-
lowing the constitution of the TCPC, the program appeared to be not
much more than a talking-point. The TCPC spent much of its first two
years sponsoring regional and international conferences on privatization,
rather than on actually engaging in the process. 29
This period of inactivity mirrored events in the political sphere. The
period between 1986-1990 in Nigeria was characterized by relatively
open debate on the political development of the country. None of that de-
bate, however, actually determined the course of that development.
Rather, the military government, while encouraging debate, ruled through
the promulgation of decrees embodying its own vision of the future di-
rection of the country. In one of the more bizarre instances of political
creativity, it decreed a national constitution characterized by a two-party
126. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
127. Compare THOMAS J. BiERSTEcKER. By the mid-1980s, virtually no African
country was enforcing the restrictive policies on foreign investments that many had
adopted in the prior decade.
128. See e.g. Chudi Ubezonu, Doing Business in Nigeria: Some Aspects of Law,
Policy and Practice, 28 INT'L LAW 345 (1994). The indiginization and foreign exchange
control regulations were formally done away with in 1994 and 1995.
129. See e.g H.R. Zayyad, MANAGEMENT OF PuBLIC ENTERPRisES, (paper presented
by the Executive director of TCPC at the National Conference on Structural Transforma-
tion of Self-Reliance and Social Justice) (Oct. 12, 1989) (unpublished mimeograph copy
on file with author). The new phase was heralded by a three-day conference in Lagos
from November 6-8, 1990.
[Vol. 21
PRIVATIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
structure "one slightly to the left, the other slightly to the right."'1'3 As-
pirants to political office were required to model their beliefs and state-
ments to conform to these bureaucratically-crafted "political" parties.
There then followed between 1990 and 1993 a staged production of
a highly engineered return to civil rule. While the first few acts - nota-
bly elections to local government bodies, state legislatures and state gov-
ernorships - went off as scripted, the mechanism began to break down
with regard to elections to national bodies, and of course collapsed with
the refusal of the military government to have counted and released the
results of the election to the office of the President of the country.'3'
The implementation of the privatization process paralleled these de-
velopments in the political arena. Between 1990 and 1993, TCPC priva-
tized either 73132 or 88133 of the 111 enterprises scheduled for privatiza-
tion, and commercialized 30 of the 35134 entities so designated. 35 Yet,
this was considered a complete and successful discharge of the require-
ments of the law because in 23 instances, it was found that entities des-
ignated for privatization or commercialization had already been disposed
of administratively, and apparently without the knowledge of policy-mak-
ers. 36 Moreover, during the privatization process, entities not previously
designated for privatization, notably the country's four largest commercial
130. See generally FoRaEST, supra note 63.
131. Id. at Chapter 11.
132. See Shasudeen Usman in WEST A ucA at 1929.
133. In an interview with this author on July 30, 1993, a TCPC employee, Mr. Al-
Hassan U. Usman, Deputy Director, Corporate Affairs, represented that 83 entities had
been privatized and that nine were on the cue for privatization. A TCPC document fur-
nished to this author contemporaneously with the interview however indicated that 88 en-
tities had been privatized, and that 23 needed no additional privatization. See Economic
Democratization - The Nigerian Privatization and Commercialization Programma at 13
(mimeograph report available from author).
134. Although 35 entities were formally designated for commercialization, the
Nigerian government apparently lacked the power to commercialize one such entity, The
African Reinsurance Company, which was a multilateral intergovernmental entity. Inter-
view with author, supra note 121. See also Shasudeen Usman, WEST AFRICA, supra note
79 (stating that only the steel mills have not been commercialized.)
135. Shasudeen Usman, supra note 79. But cf. FORREST, supra note 63 at 224 (stat-
ing that "in 1988, privatization program involving 135 enterprises was announced by the
Federal Government". Of these, 67 were to be fully privatized, 21 to be partially priva-
tized, 11 to fully commercialized, and 14 to be partially commercialized.)
136. TCPC interview with author, supra note 124. According to the employee, the
Ministry of Agriculture had "divested" the assets of these enterprises without the knowl-
edge of the remainder of the federal government Cf. Shasudeen Usman, supra Note 79,
giving the number of pre-privatization divestitures at 26, and attributing only 18 of those
to the Federal Ministry of Agriculture.
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banks were included and were fully privatized.'3
Decree 25 provided "public offering" as the standard mode of
privatization, 38 but also permitted the use of "private placements" in ex-
ceptional circumstances. 39 In practice, the private placement was resorted
to as frequently as the "public offering,"'1'4 and the use of "asset sales"
or "outright liquidation" was widespread, notwithstanding the lack of
specific statutory authorization for its use.' 4'
The Western-trained. practitioner of the financial arts - investment
banking, accounting, financial economics and transaction lawyering -
would have been perfectly at home in the wheeling and dealing environ-
137. For Sale Signs Coup in Lagos, FINANCiAL TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992 ("[i]n an ab-
rupt volte-face the military government of President Ibrahim Babangida last month an-
nounced plans to privatise the Federal holdings in 12 of Nigeria's banks. In the process,
he wrong-footed Hamza Zayyad, chairman of the Technical Committee on Privatization
and Commercialization (TCPC), who only a few weeks previously had described specula-
tion that the government might divest its holdings as baseless ... The unexpected deci-
sion was a typical example of the rule by decree which Nigeria has experienced under
military government.").
138. PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIAUZATION DEucEE, supra note 75, Art 6.2. Com-
pare Art. 4.3, (authorizing TCPC to recommend some other form of disposition "when-
ever the technical committee is of the view that any enterprise is not suitable for disposal
by public issue of shares.").
139. Id. Art. 6.2 (all offers for sale "shall be by public issues except when the Fed-
eral Military Government, on the advice of the Technical Committee, decides that the
shares of any enterprises should be sold by private placements.").
140. Thus, of the 88-odd enterprises that had been "privatized" as of July, 1993, 35
were by public offering, another four through the so-called "deferred privatization pro-
cess" in which a significant portion of the stock is sold in bulk to a state or other institu-
tion in trust for a defined group of beneficiaries (e.g. state citizens), 8 through the "sale
of assets by public tender," 7 through private placements, I through a management
buyout. The method employed in privatizing the 18/23 entities prior to the work of the
TCPC is unexplained. See mimeograph report, supra note 121 at p. 14. Somewhat differ-
ent figures are offered by Shasudeen Usman, supra note 79; notably the figure given for
"sale of assets by public tender" is 26, a number which is said to include the 18 pre-
TCPC privatizations. If this representation is correct, it raises the question of why the re-
mainder of the federal government was unaware of the disposition of assets done through
a "public tender".
141. One may distinguish between four variants of the "public offer" (i) the con-
ventional use of an exchange for an underwritten "initial public offering"; (ii) the "sale
of assets through a public tender" in which the assets of an entity are auctioned; (iii) a
management/employee/deferred "sale" or "buyout," in which a publicly advertized offer
is made to a limited class of persons; and (iv) a generalized voucher system or the a pub-
lic offering that is not underwritten. Nigeria's privatization scheme employed all but the
last of these. Private offerings typically are made to a limited class of persons usually
without any public advertisement. They may take the form of stock or asset sales, and
they may be auctioned or negotiated. Nigeria appears to have employed all of these varia-
tions in its privatization program.
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ment that characterized the functioning of the TCPC between 1990 and
1993.142 A handful of government-paid lawyers and accountants put to-
gether offering documents and made telephone calls to solicit bids for a
variety of parcels of hitherto publicly owned assets; other lawyers, ac-
countants and investment bankers responded with bids and counter-offers.
Advised by other investment bankers and economists, competing posi-
tions were resolved over beers at "old schoolboy clubs" or after-hours
visits to the homes of tennis partners in "government residential areas."
These agreements were then delivered to the Federal Military Govern-
ment for what appears to have been pro forma ratification.
Conspicuous by their absence from public discourse were any stories
of direct extralegal governmental interference, or the proverbial Nigerian
villains of administrative bribery and corruption. 143 Also noteworthy was
the infrequent use of litigation to influence the outcome.' 44 Rather, once
the technocratic machinery of the TCPC achieved a cruising speed some
time in 1990, it maintained it at a more or less monotonous whine until
the jarring political events of June 12, 1993 rearranged all aspects of
Nigerian life. 45 In the process, landmark establishments that had symbol-
ized "national patrimony" were transferred from public to private owner-
ship;' 46 the number of shares traded on the Nigerian stock exchange
(which, prior to 1988, had been in existence for a quarter of a century)
142. In its Report on the Privatization Process, the TCPC asserted that "to date
some 600 highly qualified Nigerians and over 200 professional advisers (Chartered Ac-
countants, Solicitors, Estate Valuers, Engineers, Stock Brokers and Issuing Houses) were
involved in the Implementation of the Programma in one way or other. Indeed, no other
programma in this Nigeria has ever enjoyed broad based participation of highly qualified
Nigerians like this programma. [sic] But what is more interesting is that all the profes-
sional advisers and individuals are Nigerians, because as a deliberate policy, the TCPC
had decided [sic] that the programma should be used for the training of local consul-
tants." Mimeograph report, supra note 133 at 7.
143. This of course is not to assert that the privatization process was not influenced
by these factors; merely that the factors did not generate the sort of press and public at-
tention that ordinarily one might have expected.
144. But see infra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
145. For the events of June, 1994, in which the military government declined to re-
lease the full results of a national presidential election nor to cede power to the civilian
winners of that election, see e.g. Kenneth B. Noble, Nigerian Military Rulers Annul Elec-
tion, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 1993, at Al; Ibrahim G. Babangida Address to the Nation,
BBC SUMMARY OF WoRLD BROADcAsTS, June 26, 1993; President Babangida on Reasons
for Annulling Election, June 28, 1993, available in LexisfNexis Library, BBCSWB file.
146. Two such landmarks were the Federal Palace Hotel which was privatized, and
Tafawa Balewa Square, whose management was commercialized. See GUImENEs TO
PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 81. These institutions were integrally
associated with the annual public celebration of the country's "Independence Day".
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more than doubled in under five years.' 47 The use of limited public re-
sources to finance money-losing commercial ventures for predominantly
jingoistic or like ideological reasons became rare; and perhaps most sig-
nificantly, there was indeed some rationalization of the accounts of some
enterprises. Yet, no Nigerian, not even employees of the TCPC, look
back to the privatization process with unalloyed praise, and virtually no
Nigerian today posits it as a solution to any of the country's numerous
socio-political or economic difficulties. Indeed, the privatization process,
which was already being wound down by mid-1993, 14s came to a stand-
still following the June 12 political debacle,' 49 and has not been revived.
Rather, the subsequent governments have vacillated between a return to
the generally discredited pre-1986 statist regime,' 50 and modified varia-
tions on the theme of the SAP-inspired liberal economic order by posit-
ing alternatives that while creating incentives for greater private partici-
pation in the economy assured continuing state ownership and control of
productive assets.' 5' Thus, concepts such as the leasing of state assets to
147. Interview with author, supra note 121. See also Shasudeen Usman, supra note
79 at 2930 ("[tlhe market capitalization of publicly quoted companies grew from 8 bil-
lion Naira in 1989 to over 30 billion Naira by September 1992, mainly as the result of
privatization.") This effect appears, however, to have been temporary. The volume of
trading on the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 1994 has been stated as a "derisory" $19 mil-
lion. See Tony Hawkins, Survey of Nigeria: Volumes Stay Low - Stock Exchange, FiNAN-
ciAL Tnvms, May 26, 1995.
148. The termination of the active phase of the privatization/commercialization pro-
gram was symbolized by the renaming of the TCPC as the "Bureau of Public Enter-
prises" with the assigned task of monitoring and advising on the performance of the
"commercialized" state entities. See generally, Shasudeen Usman, supra note 79.
149. See supra note 145.
150. For example, the 1994 budget presented by the military government of General
Sani Abacha returned the country temporarily to a fixed over-valued exchange regime,
significant price-control reduction of export incentives, imposition of substantial import
controls and renewed government-sponsor of industrial production. See e.g. Paul Adams,
Nigeria's New Leader Turns Back the Clock on Market Reforms, THE CHRISTIAN ScIENcE
MoNrrOR, Jan. 12, 1994 at 8; James Jukwey, Nigeria Returns to New Era of Economic
Controls, THE REuTER LiBRARv REPORT, Jan. 11, 1994 (available in Lexis/Nexis Library,
Papers File); FO.REST, supra note 63 at 244.
151. Compare the 1995 Budget address made by Gen. Sania Abacha on January 14,
1995. After acknowledging the "disappointment" and failures of the strategies embarked
on in the 1994 budget - government revenues fell, manufacturing declined by over 5%
and inflation worsened, even under official estimates - he announced a "budget of in-
centives and liberalization... to free the economy of the statutory constraints to which it
has been held hostage". Taxes and tariffs were to be lowered; the foreign exchange mar-
ket was to be subjected to "guided deregulation" including the adoption of a fixed but
flexible autonomous exchange rate system; the Foreign Exchange Control Act (first en-
acted in 1962), and the [indigenous] Enterprises agreements for the protection of invest-
ments by foreign nationals; some flexibility was to be introduced into the essentially gov-
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private entrepreneurs, joint ventures between government-owned, indige-
nous private and foreign capital, and longterm management contracts
have been floated as economic devices of the future. 152 Moreover, in-
creasing demands for renationalization of some entities, notably the large
commercial banks,'53 have been made alongside the scrapping of the
highly nationalistic "Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1989" in
order to encourage foreign investment. 54
What explains this lukewarm response to privatization in Nigeria?
D. The Limits of Privatization
As a response both to external economic concerns and domestic po-
litical pressures, the privatization process in Nigeria was bound to be un-
satisfactory to determinists of either school, and to disappoint many pro-
ponents within both schools. On the one hand, those who laud
privatization as a market-based response to Africa's economic woes have
criticized the process in Nigeria as not being sufficiently thoroughgo-
emnment-imposed interest rate charges by banks; parastatals were to be "rationalized" by
cutting down their numbers, although the method for such pruning (e.g. through privatiza-
tion, sale of assets or outright liquidation) was not specified. To the contrary, "owing to
some identified inadequacy and the huge losses incurred by government in realizing its
investment, the sale of shares in public owned enterprises is hereby suspended." See gen-
erally Abacha Announces Measures to Liberalize the Economy, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan 24, 1995 (being the full text of the speech as broadcast on
Nigerian Radio, Jan. 14, 1995) (available in Lexis/Nexis BBCSWB File). See also FOR-
REST, supra note 63, at 245. But see Little Nigeria, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 1995 at 20
("[a] deal with the IMF, which looked more likely after a deregulatory budget in January,
now seems farther away again.")
152. 1995 Budget Address, supra note 151 ("There are certain enterprises which re-
quire high managerial and technical expertise if they are to operate profitably. Govern-
ment has therefore decided that it is in the best interest of the country that these enter-
prises are not sold off, at least for now. As from January 1995, a new policy of contract
leasing will be introduced by government. This arrangement will involve contract leasing
of the enterprises to both local and foreign entrepreneurs. Additionally, in 1995 the gov-
ernment will pursue full commercialization policy for some key parastatals. Consequently,
the funding of the affected parastatals by government will cease by the end of 1995, as
they would then be expected to be self-financing.") See also Shasudeen Usman, supra
note 69 at 1930. Cf. Nigeria to Privatize 5,950 MW Utility, Then Seek 5,340 MW of Pri-
vate Power, INDEPENDENT POWER REPORT, Dec. 15, 1995 (available on Westlaw,
Magsplus database) (summarizing a program under which the National Electric Power
Authority would be "commercialized" in 1996, then leased to private operator(s) for a
period of 10 years renewable at expiration. As of the time of this writing, NEPA remains
very much a poorly run parastatal.)
153. See Tony Hawkins, Survey of Nigeria: Policy U-Turn - Banking, THE FINAN-
CIAL TIMES, May 26, 1995.
154. See id. Volumes Stay Low - Stock Exchange. See also FORREST at 245.
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ing. 55 The 111 entities scheduled for privatization represented a fraction
of the over 600 that were potentially eligible.' s6 Moreover, excluded from
privatization were such highly capitalized and resource draining entities
as the Nigerian Railways Corporation, Nigeria Airways, the electric
power authority, the international telecommunications system, steel mills,
and of course the far-flung Nigerian National Petroleum Company. The
rather amorphous concept of "commercialization" with its vague distinc-
tion between "full" and "partial"' 57 commercialization, and its even
more abstruse formulation of the nature of governmental involvement as-
sured continuing political interference with what should be essentially ec-
onomic decision-making. And the failure of the privatization rules to
modify other existing economic bottlenecks such as the limitations on
foreign investment imposed by the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion De-
crees undercut its efficacy as a means of efficiently harnessing all availa-
ble capital resources for the economic benefit of the country. 58
Not surprisingly, others have found fault with the Nigerian privatiza-
tion process for its failure to take sufficient account of the resulting dis-
tributive and political consequences. 15 9 At a basic level, the country's
choice of the public offering and private auctioning approaches (rather
than, for example, a general voucher system) limited participation to only
the affluent. That these offerings and auctions fetched only a minuscule
percentage of what had been invested in these entities 6° - and perhaps
155. See e.g. A Flicker of Light, THE ECONOMIST, March 5, 1994, p. 21.
156. In an interview with this author, a TCPC representative stated that the govern-
ment's investments in 55 privatized companies in the amount of 652 million Naira repre-
sented 2 percent of a total government investment of over 36 billion Naira in companies
that could be privatized. See interview with author, supra note 124.
157. See supra notes 14, 76-80, 112-115 and accompanying text.
158. Although the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees of the 1970s were modi-
fied in 1989 in an effort to render them less hostile to foreign investment (see e.g. Chudi
Ubezonu, supra note 128; Shasudeen Usman, supra note 79), no effort was apparently
made to coordinate the encouragement of foreign investment and the economic liberaliza-
tion policies exemplified by privatization. Compare Gen. Sani Abacha's 1995 Budget Ad-
dress, supra note 151.
159. See e.g. Maxwell 0. Chibundu, The Shift to Markets: New Movements in Inter-
national Law: Responding to Privatization (Remarks), 87 AM. Soc. INt'L L PRoc. 105,
119, 123-24 (1993). See also Francis Okafor, The Socio-Political Dimension of Privatiza-
tion and Commercialization (paper presented at the International Conference on the Im-
plementation of the Privatisation and Commercialisation Program - An African Experi-
ence," Nov. 6-8, 1990) (copy with author); Joe U. Umo, Privatisation in Nigeria: Some
Missing Links (paper presented at the Nigerian Economic Society Seminar, Feb. 4, 1988)
(copy with author).
160. The TCPC in July 1993 stated that the privatization of 55 entities with an ag-
gregate public investment of 652 million Naira had grossed total receipts of 3.37 billion
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their intrinsic value - amounted not only to a giveaway of public assets,
but further aggravated Nigeria's already notorious disparity of wealth dis-
tribution. 161 Perhaps most crucially, in a country with no regulatory or in-
stitutionalized unemployment compensation, retirement or other economic
welfare system, these basic safety nets are often provided on an ad hoc
basis by the employer. Privatization removes the use of public agitation
as a means of securing these benefits, a not insignificant consideration in
a society such as contemporary Nigeria, characterized by high unemploy-
ment and substantial underutilization of available human capital, with the
consequent ineffectiveness of such conventional tools of self-help as in-
dustrial action and other forms of economic boycotts. 162
Descriptively, these explanations are factually supportable. They are,
however, incomplete. Whatever were the economic pressures for priva-
tization, the decision to undertake it, and particularly its implementation,
is predominantly political. The decision is the unilateral act of the state
and it is controlled in all of its aspects by the class that dominates state
power. In a society like Nigeria where there exists profound religious and
ethnic cleavage between the dominant state elite and the commercial
elite, 163 privatization necessarily implicated a reduction in the resources
Naira, seemingly on its face a profitable transaction for the government. See TCPC inter-
view, supra note 124. But these figures manifest the potential loss involved in Nigeria's
privatization. The 652 million Naira were, of course, generally speaking, pre-1980 invest-
ments, while the 3.37 billion Naira reflected post-1990 currency values. Using the nair-
dollar exchange rate as mirroring real values (an assumption that the purchasing power
parity theory validates), we find that the actual value of the 3.37 billion naira at the post-
1990s prevailing exchange rate of 3 or fewer cents to the Naira amounted to under $199
Nukkuib dikkars for an investment os over $400 million dollars (using the pre-1980s ex-
change rate of about 67 cents to the Naira).In other words, Nigerians recovered less than
25 cents from privatization for each dollar its government had invested in the assets be-
ing privatized.
161. Compare Clifford D. May, Nigeria's Search for Recovery, NEW YORK TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1984 at Dl, Col. 3 ("[a]s in other oil-rich nations, however, Nigeria's wealth
was not evenly distributed. A few Nigerians became billionaires, while many lived in
squalor.")
162. It is worth noting that strikes, while common in Nigeria, are resorted to as
readily for political as for economic objectives. Indeed, strikes are often employed not by
the underprivileged or relatively poorly paid, but by the professional classes, white-collar
workers and the well-remunerated employees of the "modern" sectors of the economy
such as banks, universities, and the petroleum and natural gas industries.
163. See generally PAUL M. LutncK AND MICHAEL J. WATrs, supra note 79, at 210-
213 (detailing the interaction between political appointments to crucial economic minis-
tries during the period of structural adjustment (1986-1992, i.e. the period of privatiza-
tion), and internal power struggles among the ruling military groups, and relating these
conflicts to the relative power relationships between indigenous private and state power
structures - political and economic - on the one hand, and the disciplining external
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available to the ruling political elite, and relatively increased of the
power of the commercial elite. Where the two elites represented distinct
ethnic and religious groups, the consequence was a direct shift in the bal-
ance of power between these groups. It is therefore hardly surprising
that, as previously explained, the central government sought to retain
much of the power predominantly exercised by its ruling members
through the mechanism of reserving certain interests for state govern-
ments,164 and the so-called "golden share," which the central government
has apparently used quite extensively with regard to commercial banks.165
VI. WHnHER PRIVATIZATION?
In a real sense, the important issues that face students of the con-
temporary privatization phenomenon relate neither to its success nor to
its continuing viability. Because privatization reflects the varied political
and economic forces at work both within and without a given polity, the
influence of scholarship on its trajectory will be, at best, marginal. The
external forces that have made privatization a global phenomenon of the
"post-Cold War world order" reflect a specific moment in history whose
essential underpinning is the confluence of ascendant Western (and more
specifically U.S.) neoliberal economic and neoconservative political he-
gemony. As much as many commentators would like to suggest that
there is something unique or permanent about the current world order,166
history has witnessed too many of these transitory confluences to permit
any such sense of a permanent transformation of the structure of property
ownership, control and regulation. The one constancy of the exercise of
international hegemonic power has been its temporal limitations, and to
the extent that the survivability of privatization depends on such hege-
monic power as exercised by the U.S. and the West, its viability can be
predicted with confidence to be temporary. 67
Of course, as illustrated by the Nigerian example, it would be a
gross oversimplification to view the attraction to privatization primarily
in terms of external pressures exerted by Western institutions on the
technocratic and economic resources of the World Bank on the other.)
164. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
165. See e.g. Paul Adams, Nigerians Seek Donor's Support on Bank Control, FINAN-
CiAL TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1995 at 3; Nigeria: Appraising Privatisation, AFRICAN ECONOMIC
DIGEST, Jan. 8, 1991 (available on Lexis/Nexis, Nexis library, Papers file.)
166. See generally FRANciS FUKuyAMA, THE END OF HISTORy.
167. Compare supra notes 6-8, and accompanying text. See generally EUROMONEY,
Feb. 1996 (special issue on privatization highlighting its successes and the significant pit-
falls that lie ahead; pitfalls that flow as much from political as from economic
uncertainties.)
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"disadvantaged peoples" of Eastern Europe and the "Third World." Do-
mestic political considerations and internal pressures for economic ration-
alization within these societies played critical roles in the willingness
(and indeed eagerness) of many of their elites to adopt and implement
privatization schemes. Yet, because privatization was almost never inter-
nally generated from core domestic ideological commitments, 1' it is rea-
sonable to assume that its capacity to take root in these societies will de-
pend largely on how widely it is perceived to meet effectively the
demands of these societies. The important consideration here would not
be so much whether privatization does indeed lead to better or more effi-
cient utilization and management of limited economic resources, but
rather, whether the economic and political wellbeing of these societies
are perceived to be on the mend, and if so, whether the beneficiaries at-
tribute their fortunes to the process.
Considered in this light, the continuing interest for the legal scholar
of the privatization program is in the ways and means by which it can be
integrated and made a part of the routine life - at least in the economic
sphere - of the inhabitants of the so-called "emerging" or "transi-
tional" economies. The privatization program in Nigeria again furnishes
an exemplification of this theme.
As previously observed, Nigeria's privatization scheme, while in-
volving a fair number of domestic transaction lawyers, spawned remarka-
bly little litigation. 69 The exception to this generalization is, however,
noteworthy.
One of the entities scheduled for full privatization was the Ayip-Eku
Oil Palm Co., Ltd., in which the Federal Government had a 60% owner-
ship. 70 The Federal Government's effort to divest its interest through a
public share offering was stalled for about a year by the institution of a
lawsuit by the Obong of Calabar, a traditional ruler. The Obong sought
an injunction against the offering on the ground that the federal govern-
ment lacked title to the assets it was seeking to dispose.17' The Obong's
claim was apparently as follows:
168. See e.g. Leslie Elliott Armijo, Menem's Mania?: The Timing of Privatization in
Argentina, 1 S.W. J. oF L & TRADE IN AM. 1 (1994); JOAN M. NELSON, ED., INTRICATE
LINKS: DEMOCRATIZATION AND MARKET REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA AND EASTERN EU-
ROPE (1994). See also supra notes 53-55, 74 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
170. See Privatization and Commercialization Decree, supra note 75, Item 71.
171. For the account recounted here, I am indebted to Chief (Mrs.) I. Chigbue, Dep-
uty Director and Head of the Legal and Secretarial Department of the TCPC. The inter-
pretation given to the events is mine, not hers.
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The major asset of the Ayip-Eku Oil palm co. consisted of commu-
nal land (and the oil palm trees on them) that had been given to the fed-
eral government by the people of Calabar in exchange for the federal
government investing money in, and developing the land for, the benefit
of the Calabar people. The cession of the land was solely for this use by
the Federal Government and was not intended to divest the Calabar peo-
ple of their right in the ownership of the land. The Federal Government
was thus without power to alienate the land, and it could not do so indi-
rectly by selling stock in a corporation formed for the sole purpose of
exploiting the land.
The Federal Government responded that it had obtained the land
from the state government, not the traditional ruler, and that the state
government had given to the Federal Government full right in the land.
Any claim that the Obong had should be stated not against the federal
government, but against the state government. 72
What is interesting about this debate is the forum in which it oc-
curred, and its potentiality to have the privatization scheme fully woven
into the ordinary politics and economics of the life of the affected peo-
ple, rendering privatization not simply the abstractions of income redistri-
bution among the powerful and wealthy, but the source of genuine debate
among employees, employers, traditional rulers, and the Western-trained
elites who exercise preponderant economic and political power in devel-
oping societies. Despite the opportunities offered by the Ayip-Eku Oil
Palm Co. dispute, that debate did not occur in Nigeria; and why it did
not, probably says as much about the limitations of the role of law in the
privatization process as does the highly specialized legal skills western
lawyers have brought to bear on the privatization process in even the re-
motest comers of the world.
The Obong not only failed to persuade a Western-trained judge of
the merits of his claims, but his highly sophisticated arguments necessa-
rily crafted in the language of Western legalism rallied few of the layper-
sons outside his immediate entourage to his cause. What explains this lat-
ter (and by far the more important) failure? Solving this riddle would go
a long way in establishing the role and future of privatization in the eco-
nomic and political life of developing societies.
172. Interestingly, the Federal government does not appear to have relied strongly
on any claim of sovereign immunity, nor on the country's "land use decree" of 1978, by
which the Federal Government purported to vest in itself title to all land in the country,
while granting an indefinite right of use to all persons who would otherwise have had ti-
tle to such land. (This observation is based on the author's conversation with Mrs.
Chigbue, supra note 170.)
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In some ways, the willingness of the Obong to resort to the judicial
system to challenge the actions of the Federal Government represents a
triumph for proponents of a transcendent global relationship between eco-
nomic modernity and the "rule of law."' For most such proponents,
that triumph is evidenced in the seeming test of the willingness of the
ruling military government to subject its authority to control by a civilian
judiciary on a matter of substantial national policy. However, it also sug-
gested the possible continuing relevance of traditional institutional struc-
tures and practices to such national policy-making. The vitality of this
latter point is undercut by the lukewarm interest this potentially signifi-
cant conflict generated among the Nigerian intelligentsia, especially the
privatization lawyers and economic journalists. Among the local commu-
nities of the Calabar area, the Obong's insistence that the rights previ-
ously granted to the Federal Government reverted to the traditional com-
munity when that government relinquished it, seemed all too obvious,
lawyers were content to frame issues in the arcane procedural language
of standing, "real party-in-interest," "sovereign immunity," and the
like.' 74 For the privatization expert fixated on the establishment of the
"rule of law" as a core ingredient of the process, 75 this emphasis on for-
mal legal argumentation would of course be a welcome one. But these
experts who find the route to economic growth and prosperity in the op-
eration of formal legal rules - their adoption and/or implementation -
do so only by overlooking history.176 The presence of formal rules and
their implementation may afford to the foreign investor a sense of secur-
ity, but that perception is often illusory. The climate for privatization de-
pends more on the overall political and economic structures of a society
than on any reliance on formal legal instruments; however well-crafted
and abstemiously followed. Proponents of privatization as a tool of mod-
em economic growth thus ignore or underestimate at a substantial risk to
the success of their programs the need to fold into and make part of the
process the particularized needs of traditional communities.'"
173. For the development of this argument, see Maxwell 0. Chibundu, supra note
43.
174. Interview with Mrs. Chigbue, supra note 171.
175. Compare Douglas Webb, Privatization in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Legal Issues, 87 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PRoc. 111, 113 (1992) ("[there are three principal
components of the legal framework required to support privatization. The first is the
guarantee of the rule of law, exemplified through a stable body of laws, readily interpret-
able, widely published and supported by effective judicial recourse.")
176. See e.g. David J. Trubek, Towards a Social Theory of Law, 80 YALE L. J. 4
(1972); JOHN GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALiSM (1980); Maxwell 0. Chibundu, supra note
43.
177. Noteworthy, albeit in a slightly different context, is the recent intemationaliza-
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The Obong's challenge exemplifies two very important structural
trends that the Nigerian ruling classes now appear to recognize as essen-
tial to the making of a viable postcolonial society: political decentraliza-
tion and greater local autonomy in the making and implementation of ec-
onomic decisions. 78 Although nominally a "federal Republic," military
rule and overdependence on revenue from the export of crude oil had, in
the two decades following Nigeria's civil war, turned the country into a
highly centralized society in which all but institutions of the central gov-
emment lacked initiative and the accompanying sense of responsibility.
By the late 1980s, it had become evident to the Nigerian intelligentsia
(and indeed the ruling elites) that one way of grappling with the manifest
failures at the center was to devolve power not only to the private sector,
but to public regional and local bodies as well. 179 The confident exercise
of local autonomy is invariably enhanced by the relative economic inde-
pendence of the local entities, and Nigeria's privatization scheme appears
to have embodied this assumption. 80 The Obong's challenge thus fits
quite neatly into the emerging pathos of decentralization, and should
have been viewed as an integral element of its structuring. Specifically,
what role do "traditional" institutions (such as Efik land-tenure rules and
the Obong's Court) have in the development of a "modern" economic
state in post-independence Nigeria? Are these roles best sorted through
the judicial mechanism? It may be that the "rule of law" - at least in
its dominant Western (and, therefore, modern Nigerian) conception - is
most convincingly demonstrated by the invocation of facially "neutral"
procedural doctrines as embodied by the rules on "standing," "sovereign
tion of conflicts within another southeastern Nigerian community, the Ogoni people, over
the exploitation of crude oil resources found on their land. Although, in classic fashion,
different interests have exploited the tragedies of that community to score propaganda
points by simplistically reducing the issues to conflicts of evil and good - e.g. "human
rights" versus "rapacious multinational corporations," "military dictatorships," "self-
determination" and so on - undoubtedly central to the conflict has been a genuine disa-
greement among the Ogoni people, and between them and other Nigerians, as to the
tradeoffs between external exploitation of their resources and the structure and distribu-
tion of political power within Ogoniland, and vis-a-vis the rest of Nigeria. See e.g. Wil
Haywood, In Ogoniland: The Last Days and Legacy of Ken Saro-wiwa, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, April 7, 1996 at 19; A Tainted Hero, THE GUARDIAN, March 23, 1996 at T24;
Howard W. French, Deadly Logic in Nigeria, THE NEw YORK Tnms, November 12, 1995
at A18, Col. 1.
178. See e.g. Privatization and Commercialization Decree, supra note 75, art. 6;
mimeograph report supra note 124 at 9. Compare Maxwell 0. Chibundu, supra note 43
(discussing the pressures for political decentralization in contemporary African polities.)
179. See generally JAMES S. WuNscH & DEuI OwOwu. EDs., FAILURE OF THE CEN-
TRALzED ArcAs STATE (1990).
180. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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immunity" and the like, but it is more likely that a sustained privatiza-
tion program must come to grips with its distributive consequences on
the polity. This is as true for the apportionment of political power, as it
is for equity in the sharing of economic resources. By far, the vast ma-
jority of Nigerians - as well as the peoples of most sub-Saharan African
countries - still operate outside of the asset-rich industrial, mining and
service sectors that are being privatized.18 For these people, association
with the central government is rarely through a direct regulatory eco-
nomic framework such as direct taxation, health or sanitary regulations,
welfare payments or even public schools. Rather, such association is fre-
quently mediated through socio-political institutions like the Obong
whose claim on their loyalties depends in part on the institution's capac-
ity to deliver such economic goods as potable (usually pipe-borne) water
and/or electricity, chemical fertilizers and insecticides for agricultural
production, and, perhaps, a modest health clinic. If the privatization pro-
cess is, as I have demonstrated, more than an exercise in economic ra-
tionalization,8 2 there seems to be little reason why it cannot be effec-
tively used in this intermediation process. Additionally, unless it is put to
this task, the vast majority of the population would be excluded from its
ambit, and it would be irrational to expect from that population any loy-
alty to it. Of course, the task is made no easier by the unpleasant reality
that lacking the material resources with which to command the attention
and services of practical lawyers, these interests might as well be nonex-
istent, and more than likely will generally be treated as such.
Nonetheless, whether longterm Western investors in Ashanti Gold-
fields - as separate from the transactional lawyers, investment bankers
and accountants who put the "deals" together - will get the benefit of
their investments, and will be encouraged, therefore, to make similar in-
vestments in the entities of other "emerging" markets depends in large
measure on the solution that exists to the Ayip-Eku puzzle. For most Af-
rican countries, entrenched postcolonial institutions and interest groups
have put beyond debate such privatization schemes as "voucher" distri-
butions, and the poverty of administrative, bureaucratic and organiza-
tional skills assure that complete state disinvestment is highly unlikely in
the foreseeable future. Caught in this web, the only way of escaping the
181. At its most expansive, Nigeria's privatization involved at most 600,000 house-
holds; a minuscule number in an economy of over 90 million people. See mimeograph re-
port, supra note 124 at a12. Compare Nigeria: Appraising Privatization, supra note 112
(as of 1991, 400,000 shareholders had been created as a result of the privatization pro-
cess, representing over 60% of the shareholding population of Nigeria.)
182. See supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
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unstable gyrations of partial nationalization and partial privatization 83
(that in the long-run do more harm than a stable equilibrium at either
pole) is to assure the involvement in the privatization process of those
socio-political institutions with claim to legitimation from a substantial
cross-section of the population. These institutions cannot be limited to
those that conventionally operate with ease in the modem sector such as
civil service associations, labor and teachers unions, associations of the
petty bourgeoisie and market women, or even state governments, 8 4 but
should include those institutions of traditional authority that continue to
exercise significant albeit generally overlooked sway over the habits and
belief systems (i.e. law) that regulates the lives of those forgotten rural
farmers and "informals" of urban centers. 85 These people may have no
direct say on the particulars of the economic regime that their "modem"
leaders adopt, but they remain perennial brooding presences in the rheto-
ric (and, therefore, actuality) of development programs; the creed that
provides the ultimate yardstick against which the success or failure of a
privatization program in sub-Saharan africa (and perhaps in Eastern Eu-
rope and Latin America as well) will be measured.
183. See e.g. Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Be-
tween Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L REV. 223 (1995).
184. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. But see R. Stephen Brent, supra
note 61 ("the government cannot afford to bow to an interest group.")
185. Cf. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE
Tii WoRLD (June Abbott Translation 1989) at 135 et. seq. (analyzing the role of law
influencing economic choices made by small enterprise oriented Peruvians functioning
outside of the "formal" (i.e. legally prescribed and regulated) sectors of the economy.)
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